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1Foreword
This working paper was initiated on the basis of our joint interest in the hearing instruments
industry. We represent two different departments at the Copenhagen Business School and
have, therefore, in many ways very different research traditions. Furthermore, Kristina Lee is
involved in the industry on a daily basis through her Industrial Research program. This
connection has produced insights which also spurred many a discussion.
The research has spanned about 13 months of effort, although at various levels of intensities,
and it has been highly explorative. Our curiosity has produced a vast number of observations
and the present report is, thus, certainly more comprehensive, but also perhaps with more
perspectives than planned.
We expect it to be used for three different purposes. Firstly, as an in-depth analysis of the
industry, particularly providing some explanation for the observed stability of market structure
over time in the face of technological innovations. Secondly, the report may serve as teaching
material supplementing theoretical treatments in industry analysis and technology strategy.
Finally, the research report may serve as a springboard for future research.
The outline of the report is as follows: Section 1 provides an introduction to the empirical and
theoretical problem to be investigated; section 2 outlines the industry’s structure; section 3 is a
review and discussion of three theoretical perspectives on the relation between technology and
industry structure; section 4 is an in-depth industry analysis of all levels and interfaces of the
value chain; in sections 5 and 6 we consider the future perspectives and line up some theoreti-
cal implications of the analysis.
We would like to use this opportunity to thank three persons who have seen earlier drafts of
this work. They have all in their own way been very helpful in framing our work. We acknowl-
edge the constructive inputs from Ivo Zander, Stockholm School of Economics; Jens Frøslev
Christensen, Copenhagen Business School; and an industry representative whose identity we
cannot reveal. Furthermore, we appreciate the sparring provided by Torben Poulsen, Technical
University of Denmark.
Whether the reader is an industry representative, a student, or a researcher, we hope you will
enjoy reading our analysis. Comments can be directed to either of us at the Copenhagen
Business School and will be most welcomed. 
Kristina Lee & Peter Lotz
March, 1998
2Summary
This report examines the stability in the hearing instrument industry. Over the past 25 years,
the industry has changed only very little in terms of industry structure. It seems odd that a
technologically very active industry should be stable in terms of structure. Current theoretical
and practical concerns of hyper-competition and high pace technology development argue that
technological innovations should have severe impact on industry structure. In a broad-scope
analysis of the industry, we seek to correlate the type of technological development carried out
in the industry to its structural development.
The empirical analysis consists of an examination of possible factors influencing the stable
industry structure covering the entire value chain including the interfaces within it. We
conclude that there are a number of stabilizing factors in the hearing instruments industry
structure and technology which account for the relative stability of the industry (measured by
changes in market shares, mergers & acquisitions, entry and exit). 
The factors most important to stability is, in our view, the syst mic character of hearing
instrument technology and the “sticky” distribution channel (dispensers). The former implies
that possibilities for breakthrough technology in the hearing instrument itself and its sub-
components are restricted, providing a high degree of inertia. The structure and competence of
the dispenser level implies that the commercialization of new types of hearing instruments
takes place at a slow rate. Both factors limit first-mover advantages and thus competitive
upheaval. 
But also customers and suppliers contribute to stability: At the end-user level, factors contrib-
uting to stability are stigma, getting-used-to-effects, and the issue of essentially trying to make
a product which compensates for a defect organ. Furthermore, our analysis of the price-
elasticity of hearing instruments show that price reductions will not be profitable to the
industry and will not increase market penetration substantially. Combined, these factors
essentially establish a demand limit which is not expected to be moved or overcome unless
significant improvements in price/performance of hearing instruments come about. At the
supplier level, the stabilizing factors come from oligopolistic competition and the systemic
character of hearing instrument technology. In the component market for one important type
of strategically important parts (transducers), competition has historically been limited with
only one or two suppliers, a factor which limits variation significantly.
The analysis of actions and moves by hearing instrument manufacturers lead us to term the
type of competition among them as one of a “fri ndly oligopoly”. This expression is meant to
signify the friendly coexistence of a number of important, competing hearing instrument
manufacturers. We conjecture it to stem from a defensive attitude, as reasons for overtly
3competitive behavior are few (price reductions and increased advertising seem to have little
effect on market shares). The friendly oligopoly has enabled a number of joint efforts among
competitors (patent pool, joint R&D-projects and alliances, development of shared fitting
software, production agreements, and joint marketing). This obviously gives competition a
different face than is usually portrayed.
We question the possibility of  future stability in light of digital signal processing technology.
This new technology may change the competence distribution between suppliers and hearing
instrument manufacturers. The recent success of Widex’ fully digital hearing instrument,
Senso, may signify a new era in the hearing instrument industry. However, these potential
changes remain to gain full effect.
In terms of theoretical considerations, we question the predictive usefulness of the innovation
typologies which have been proposed recently, although their explanatory power may prevail.
In our analysis of the hearing instrument industry over the past 25 years, we could not identify
innovations with disruptive effects on industry structure. Analytically, that may have two
reasons: One, there was no innovations with this potential; and two, the innovations were
there, but their effects may have been restrained. Our analysis shows the inadequacies of
existing theories in distinguishing between these two possibilities. This industry does not lack
innovations, but neither does it lack stabilizing factors which provide a “bulwark” against
disruptions in structure. While we cannot measure these two effects against each other, our
analysis suggests that we in the hearing instrument industry are dealing with a combination of
innovations with limited potential for disruptive effects and a strong “fence” of stabilizing
factors dampening variations.
Since stability is the hallmark of mature industries (which often are perceived as boring),
understanding why such industries are stable is crucially important for developing our models
and ideas about industrial organization and strategic management in especially in such
industries.
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51 Introduction
It is commonly accepted that competition and technology nowadays change at an ever
increasing speed. Observations of breakthroughs in technology (microprocessors, biotechnol-
ogy, software) and the ensuing emergence of new strong companies (Texas Instruments,
Genentech, Microsoft) or the elimination of old flagships (Facit, WordPerfect) have led
business people and researchers to speak of a new era in competition in which nothing is
stable, technology is unpredictable, consumers are disloyal, and competitors come and go
(D’Aveni, 1995, is an example).
An influential strand of theories elaborating on the product-life-cycle (Utterback & Abernathy,
1975; Abernathy & Utterback, 1978) has demonstrated that new technologies may disturb the
“law-and-order” in established industries (Klein, 1977; Tushman & Anderson,  1986; Hender-
son & Clark, 1990; Suarez & Utterback, 1995). This research tradition considers what happens
in an industry when a new technology appears, and conjectures a causal relation running from
technology to industry structure. It provides one possible reason why industries may be
turbulent.
Accepting that technology may cause turmoil in an industry, it may come as a surprise that
some industries with high technological activity are relatively stable anyway. The hearing
instruments (hearing aids) industry is typically described as a technologically vigorous area.
Important features of annual reports from hearing instruments companies (see e.g. recent
annual reports from Oticon or Phonak) are always the applause of new technological break-
throughs, and general technical magazines (and newspapers) frequently report on technological
progress in hearing instruments (e.g. Adam, 1996). And yet, since the last major entry in the
early 1970s, the structure of the hearing instrument industry has remained surprisingly stable
(stability measured by e.g. entry and exit, market shares, and merger activity).
The purpose of this article is to investigate the stability of the hearing instruments industry over
this period. In our attempt to answer this question, we follow two main paths. The first is a
discussion of what it takes for a technology to cause turmoil. That is, not all technological
innovations have the potential of allowing newcomers into an industry. This discussion builds
on the work of Anderson & Tushman (1986) and Henderson & Clark (1990). Our approach
includes a study of the specific character of the hearing instrument technology, emphasizing the
consequences of the systemic features of the technology on the possibilities for turbulence. The
second path tries to identify counteracting forces, that is, factors that prevents possible major
technological breakthroughs from disrupting the industry. We call these forces stabilizing
factors and identify a wide range of them on all levels and interfaces of the value chain.
To a large extent, our study is an investigation of an industry which is in a “mature” stage,
6answering the question of why the industry continues to exhibit the same old patterns of
behavior and structure instead of e.g revitalizing or engaging in cut-throat competition. Or, in
other words, what creates inertia in this industry? Framed this way, the study is a broad-scope
analysis of a specific industry, trying to cover a wide range of features relevant for the question
of stability. The study does, however, focus on two aspects, which we consider of particular
interest: The character of technological development in the industry and the nature of competi-
tion. In order to comprehend the full dynamics of the industry and place these two aspects in
their right setting, we have gone a long way to try to examine the entire value chain, from end-
users to distributors to manufacturers and to component suppliers.
This analysis is reported in section 2, with the discussions of technology and competition in the
core section 4.3. Section 1 presents the basics about the industry, including evidence on
stability, plus a discussion on the interaction between technology and industry structure. After
having identified what has kept the industry in its existing shape over the past 25 years, we ask
the question in section 3 of whether there are signs of refurbishing in the industry, any changes
that may potentially cause the industry to restructure. And finally, in section 4, we outline a
number of potential implications for theory of our study.
As should be obvious (if only by its sheer size), the nature of the study is not that of an article.
Rather, what we present here is a “research report”, communicating to others our observations
from a particular industry. True, we have tried to make sense of our observations and to place
them in a theoretical framework (that goes of course especially for the influence of technology
on structure), but the emphasis has been more on painting a comprehensive picture of the
industry than on testing a specific hypothesis. But with the basics documented in this report,
we can move on to more specific analyses.
2 At first, the industry was only able to alleviate so-called conductive hearing impairment, but later
also sensorineural hearing impairment could be accommodated. Now, conductive hearing impair-
ment can be medically remedied, and hearing instruments are primarily targeted towards
sensorineural impairment, that is, defects in the inner ear.
3 Cochlear implants are not substitutes for hearing instruments.
4 Examining US data 1965-1996, we found growth in unit sales to be totally un-correlated with growth
in GDP (real or nominal).
5 The American trade association (Hearing Industry Association, HIA) has 38 manufacturing
members.
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2 Industry structure and history
The hearing instrument industry as we term it today has existed for about 100 years. The
industry is concerned with alleviating hearing impairment (specifically, so-called sensorineural
hearing impairment2) with external hearing instruments. Defined this way, the boundary of the
industry is relatively clear-cut. It does, for example, not include implants3 or other medi-
cal/surgical solutions to hearing problems.
The hearing instrument industry is not a large industry. Total revenues was in 1994 app. $1
billion (wholesale prices) on a worldwide basis, and the number of instruments produced is
some 5 million a year (Frost & Sullivan, 1994). It is estimated that for the second half of 1990s
the growth in units will be 2 pct. yearly, while growth in value will reach 5 pct. accounting for
both inflation and more expensive instruments (Frost & Sullivan, 1994). The US market was in
1993 the largest market, accounting for almost 40 pct. of the total world market revenues,
while Europe accounts for app. 35 pct. Measured in units, the relative size of the European
market is larger and the US-market smaller, due to the higher unit-prices in the US.
Most geographic markets grow at a very stable rate, but the US-market is somewhat more
volatile and has been influenced by more or less random events. Thus, after 15 years of
relatively steady growth, unit sales dropped in 1993 and 1994, probably influenced by FDA
(Food and Drug Administration) and US-Senate discussions about tougher hearing aid
regulation (Strom, 1997).4
Present industry structure
The structure of the industry seem to be relatively fragmented. No one company dominates the
world industry, and worldwide almost 200 companies claim to produce hearing instruments.5
However, many of these companies are small, locally oriented and technologically unsophisti-
cated.
8Table 1
Hearing instrument companies with programmable instruments, 1997
Founding
year
Start of hearing
instr. production Company name Headquarter Ownership
1979 1979 Argosy MN, USA Private
1994 1989 Audio ‘D’ PA, USA Private
1940 1940 Beltone IL, USA Private
1925/1936 1947/1936 Bernafon-Maico Switzerland / MN, USAOticon (1996)
1948 1948 Dahlberg (Miracle Ear) MN, USA Conglomerate
1943 1943 GN Danavox Denmark Conglomerate
1976 1979 Hearing Services Internat. MN, USA Argosy (1988)
1986 1986 Micro-Tech MN, USA Private
1981 1981 Omni Hearing Systems TX, USA Starkey (1988)
1904 1946 Oticon Denmark Public
1891 1948 Philips Hearing Instrum. The NetherlandsConglomerate
1947 1947 Phonak SwitzerlandPublic
1954 1954 Qualitone MN, USA Starkey (1996)
1984 1984 ReSound CA, USA Public
1956 1956 Rexton Germany Siemens (1986)
1847 1910 Siemens Hearing Instrum. Germany Conglomerate
1996 1990 Sonar (3M) MN, USA ReSound (1996)
1963 1971 Starkey MN, USA Private
1964 1964 Unitron Canada Private
1956 1956 Widex Denmark Private
Notes: In cases when founding year is after start of hearing instrument production, the present
company is continuing activities from other companies.
The years in parenthesis under ownership are the years of take-over.
The years for Bernafon-Maico represent Bernafon and Maico respectively, since both
companies were active hearing instrument manufacturers before they were merged in
1986.
Sources: The list of companies appeared in Hearing Journal, May 1997. 
Information about years is from Skafte (1996), Hearing Journal, Nov. 1997, company web
sites or direct inquires.
Information about headquarters is from Hearing Journal, Dec. 1997.
Information about ownership is from Hearing Journal, Nov. 1997, web-sites or direct
inquires.
Table 1 provides a list of all companies having launched “programmable hearing instruments”
at the US market. Programmable hearing instruments were, until recently, the most advanced
instruments in terms of signal processing. This is not necessarily a list of the world’s largest
companies, but the companies on the list have all shown a certain technological commitment to
6 See the end of this section for a note on data.
7 The market share of Oticon has increased considerably since 1993 (table 2), due mainly to the
acquisition of Ascom Audiosys (Bernafon)(see below).
8 In 1997 Starkey Laboratories had annual sales of USD 300 mill. and 2,350 employees (Ward’s
Business Directory 1998), while Oticon (the group) in 1996 had a net turnover of app. USD 165 mill.
and employed some 1,700 persons (company web site). Figures on Siemens’ hearing instrument
activities are not available due to the group structure.
9 Oticon’s presentation materials; Merrill Lynch (1997).
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the industry, and for the non-American companies an indication of internationally orientation.
There are 20 companies on the list, six of which, however, are subsidiaries of other hearing
instrument companies. On this basis it seems fair to say that a roster of about 15 companies
(with subsidiaries) would be sufficient to cover all important players in the industry.
It appears that the companies are concentrated in relatively few geographical areas: In North
America, Minnesota (Minneapolis) hosts most of the companies, and in Europe, Denmark has
a disproportionate number of companies. No Japanese companies appear on the list. Only one
Japanese company, RION, seem to operate internationally. We shall return to the other parts
of the table below.
Looking at overall market shares,6 Siemens was in 1996 the largest company, followed by
Starkey and Oticon7, all of them with market shares roughly between 15 and 20 percent
according to industry participants.8 Probably 80% of the market is covered by the 9-10 largest
companies.9 
There are two main types of hearing instruments in terms of design: 1) Behind-the-ear (BTE)
instruments, which have a case behind the ear connected via a small plastic tube to an ear
piece, and 2) instruments with all parts in one case placed in the e r. The latter type may be
subdivided in a) the traditional in-the-ear (ITE) instruments with the case fitted into the outer
ear, and b) in-the-canal (ITC) instruments and c) completely-in-the-canal (CIC) instruments
which are very small and almost invisible since they are placed deeper in the ear canal. Overall,
BTE is the most popular type of instrument, covering app. 55 pct. of the world market, but its
share is slowly decreasing. In the US, ITE instruments have long been the most frequently
dispensed instrument, now rapidly being substituted by ITC/CIC instruments (Frost & Sullivan,
1994).
A breakdown of the world market into the three product types (see table 2) reveals a structure
with a clear leader in each segment, especially in the ITE and ITC products. (These latter
product-markets are dominated by North American companies, probably because of the
preference for that type of products in that geographical area.)
10 In an industry with n companies, the HHI index is calculated as 3si2, where si is company i’s (i = 1,
2, 3, ... n) market share measured in percent. The value of HHI thus ranges from 0 (indefinitely
many small companies in the industry) to 10000 (one company, a monopolist, with a market share of
100).
11 Industries with a HHI of more than 1800 are likely to trigger anti-trust investigations by the US
Department of Justice.
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Table 2
Hearing instruments
World market shares (revenues) in three product areas (percentages), 1993
Behind-the-ear In-the-ear In-the-canal
Siemens 24 14 12
Oticon 10 <5 <5
Danavox 9 <5 <5
Philips 7 <5 <5
Phonak 7 <5 <5
Widex 6 <5 <5
Starkey <5 29 31
Miracle Ear (Dahlberg ) <5 14 15
Beltone <5 10 12
Argosy <5 8 8
Note: <5 means a market share of less than 5 pct. in that product area.
Source: Frost & Sullivan (1994)
The structure of each of the three product segments is roughly the same: A leader accounting
for 24-31 pct. of the market followed by a handful of important players with 6-15 pct. market
share. The degree of concentration varies, however, slightly. The “old” product (BTE) has a
less concentrated structure (a Hirschman-Herfindahl index, HHI,10 of app. 1000), while the
“newer” ITE (with a HHI of app. 1400) and especially the “newest” ITC product (HHI of app.
1600) are slightly more concentrated.11
A closer look at the seemingly fragmented structure in the hearing instrument industry
therefore reveals a concentration that qualifies the industry as an genuine oligopoly.
Industry history
In 1953 the transistor (invented in 1949) made it into hearing instruments, allowing new and
smaller designs, not only because of the transistors themselves but also because of lower
power demands and therefore smaller batteries (Bergenstoff, 1993; Hearing Journal, Nov.
1997). Many different designs competed, and only late in the 1960s the eventual winning
design, the BTE instrument, gained more than a 50% market share in the US. The companies
12 In the mid 1950 US-sales increased rapidly, but during the decade from 1958 to 1967, unit sales
increased only 25% to about 400,000 (Hearing Journal, Nov. 1997). From 1967 sales increased until
1972, only to fall back to the 1967-level in 1977 (due to a Federal Trade Commission intervention).
From then on, however, sales increased rapidly.
13 As indicated earlier, BTE is still the preferred type in the rest of the world.
14 To some degree they are competing, but the also have different applications: The BTE’s are
especially good for children and for persons with severe hearing losses.
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engaged in this turbulent battle were on the one hand the old, “pre-transistor” companies, and
on the other hand the range of new, truly “electronic” companies, established in the 1950s.
Few new companies entered in the 1960s, perhaps due to the slow growth in sales.12
Barely established as an industry standard, the BTE instrument was challenged by the ITE
instrument. Actually, as early as in the mid 1950's both Danavox and Miracle Ear had pre-
sented hearing instruments which had all parts in one shell in the ear. In 1968, this type of
products had captured only 9% of the US market, increasing to 31% in 1977. (Hearing
Journal, Nov. 1997). In 1983 ITE instruments had captured more than 50% of the US market
(Cranmer, 1985), and from that time ITE (with its sub-types of ITC and CIC) has dominated
the American market. Today, only 16% of the instruments sold in the US are BTE.13
The development of ITE instruments was spurred by the miniaturization of components (e.g.
batteries and microphones) and the development of integrated circuits. With these advances, it
technologically seemed to be a bigger problem to make high quality, reliable ITE instruments
than to make them small (Oticon web site). The major problem for the penetration of ITE
instruments was therefore not technological, but logistic: While BTE instruments are standard
products, ITE instruments are custom-made since the whole ITE instrument must fit the ear
perfectly (Bergenstoff, 1993). It was the American company Starkey that first solved that
problem, entering the industry from the distribution-side: The company was founded in 1961
as a dispenser, expanded with a molding laboratory in 1968, and introduced ITE instruments in
1971. (We shall return to this innovation in section 3 below.) Although Starkey earned a clear
first-mover advantage, other companies followed, and by the mid 1970's ITE instruments were
well established, at least in the US.
From this time, we thus have the two main hearing instrument designs established.14 The
industry had found its “shapes”, its “dominant designs”, thereby moving from “adolescence” to
“maturity”. Of course technological development did not come to a halt with that, but most
uncertainty about the overall design of a hearing instrument was eliminated. We therefore
divide the newer industry history in two distinct period: One ranging from the introduction of
transistors in 1953 to the establishment of the dominant design in the mid-1970's, and one
covering the following two decades. For the remaining part of this report, our focus will be on
the latter period in an attempt to understand the stability of the industry in this period.
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Beyond the technology, however, there is another reason for choosing the mid-1970's as a
turning point: In the first period, US distribution started with dealers marketing normally only
products from one manufacturer. For example, Beltone, established in 1940, set up a national
network of dispensers exclusively dealing with Beltone instruments already in 1941(Hearing
Journal, Nov. 1997). During the 1950's and 1960's this system was gradually abandoned and
by the mid-1970's it only included a minority of distributors. The single-line marketers were
substituted by more independent multi-line dispensers, carrying instruments from several
manufacturers. The reason for this change was the emergence of the “clinical referral system”.
In this, a medically trained “audiologist” examines the patient and prescribes a specific brand
and model of instrument, which is then provided by a dealer (Skafte, 1996). To be able to
benefit from this system, dealers had to carry many different models. Also pushing this
development was that the Federal Trade Commission – for antitrust reasons – intervened and
required one manufacturer to stop requiring distributors to sell only that manufacturer’s
products in 1953 (Skafte, 1996). 
Furthermore, the referring audiologists were unhappy with the situation, too: Some felt that
they should not only chose the hearing instrument for the end-user but also provide it. This
was, however, considered “unethical” by many, especially the association of audiologist.
Nonetheless, some audiologists started dispensing around 1970, and in 1978 it was legally
enforced that audiologists could also sell hearing instruments (Hearing Journal, Nov. 1997).
While still considered two different types of dispensers, the former franchising single-line
dealers and the audiologists both converged towards the now well-known American hearing
instrument dispenser. Not only legally independent from manufacturers, dispensers also
became more and more independent in choosing which instruments to fit a particular patient:
The 1950's and the 1960's saw the growth of numerous “hearing health care clinics” through-
out the world. As a result of their research hearing instruments were improved (Bergenstoff,
1993). But also the general knowledge about hearing was enhanced, and many new measuring
instruments were developed. Equipped with more knowledge and with new measuring
instruments, the dispensers came out of the first period as a truly independent and indispens-
able part of the American hearing health industry.
Industry structure development
As shown in table 1, all existing European companies and many of the American companies
have been active since the 1950s. The 1960s was a particularly quiet decade in terms of entry,
and except for the important entry of Starkey, only in the late 1970s we saw some entry
activity again, maybe spurred by the growth in US sales from 1977. The 1980s witnessed a
handful of entries, typically based on some proprietary technology. These companies have yet
to prove that they will be long-term survivors.
While table 1 registers survivors, it would be more ideal to have information on also non-
surviving companies, that is all entries (and exits). Such data are hard to establish, but a
15 That was probably slightly overestimated in the 1980s, when they struggled to adjust to the
customized ITE production.
16 This particular quote is from a telephone interview with Mrs. Marjorie Skafte, Editorial Director of
Hearing Review, in October 1997. Mrs. Skafte has been a hearing instrument trade magazine
reporter for more than 30 years.
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historic review of the industry (Skafte, 1996) does confirm that entry has indeed been limited.
Also, there has been relatively little merg r and acquisition activity within the industry.
Starkey did buy a couple of small companies in the 1980s, and in 1993 Dahlberg was acquired
by Bausch & Lomb (US), which, however, had only minor activities in hearing instruments.
More important in terms of industry structure was the 1995 Oticon acquisition of the Swiss
company Ascom Audiosys (Bernafon-Maico), since its size was about a third of Oticon (after
Ascom’s acquisition of Bosch’s (G) activities in hearing instruments). Also ReSound has been
active: It acquired Viennatone (AUT), and in 1996 it bought 3M Hearing Health (renamed
SONAR) whose patents were an important asset (see also section 4.3).
Data on long-term market shares would be the “correct” measure of structural development,
but unfortunately it is not available (see section 1.3). There is, however, indications of great
stability: Over the past two decades, it has been the industry’s opinion that Siemens, Starkey
and Oticon have been the leading companies worldwide. Furthermore, over the past three
decades the three Danish companies (Oticon, Danavox, and Widex) together have been said to
cover one quarter of world demand.15 These two statements are confirmed by the different
(and incommensurable) figures on market shares that we have had access to (non reported).
But accurate long-term data on shares are not available (see sub-section below) 
To some degree, therefore, we rely on secondary data sources in drawing a picture of industry
development. One such source is experienced industry observers and participants. Whenever
we have asked persons with relations to the industry their opinion on industry structure, we
have had answers like “It has stayed very much the same over the last 20-30 years”.16 Such
statements may be biased in many ways, but we are nonetheless convinced that they contain a
reasonably correct perception of the development.
Incomplete as our data may be, it is our conviction that the overall trend in hearing instrument
industry structure since the mid-1970s, therefore, is one of stability, when assessed by
measures as entry and exit, mergers and acquisitions and market shares. We must admit,
though, that precaution is necessary, and the next section deals in more detail with the data
problem.
A methodological remark on the availability of data
As we stated above, data on our subject is not readily available. But also industry stability is
very difficult to measure. In principle, our hypothesis is very “data demanding”: It requires
17 And only at this level, meaningful analysis of company behavior can take place. This is a recurring
problem for economists analyzing publicly available data. For example, even when Davies & Geroski
(1997) supplemented UK census data with a range of other data sources, they could not overcome the
problem of dis-aggregating industries from a “3-digit” to the more relevant “4-digit” level.
18 Of the institutions approached should be mentioned the Hearing Industries Association (HIA) (USA),
the Swedish agency for procurement of hearing instruments (SUB), and the PIMS Database (USA).
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data on individual, long-term, international market shares. This poses a series of problems.
First, what is a market share, or rather, what is the market? In this case, we would like the
market to be the total world market for hearing instruments. This definition, however, rules out
most usual data sources: Only very few nations generate general data on market shares in
industries, and no coordination across nations is possible. Also, in general statistical sources,
industries are rarely dis-aggregated to the level of so narrowly defined industries as hearing
instruments.17 Second, census data and the like in this area do not exist for long periods. And
third, even if market share data exist, census data cannot identify companies over time.
Companies may change legal status, ownership or headquarter address and every time the
question arises as to whether the company is the same before and after the change. All in all,
census data may be used for studies of entry and exit or of changes in concentrations ratios,
but for the study of the relative position of identified companies over time, census data are still
not applicable (if available at all).
Some of these problems are alleviated using less rigorous data sources. Since market shares is
a fundamental variable in strategic planning, most companies try to estimate at least their own
share of the relevant market. However, such data are typically considered confidential and not
publicly available. This problem is exacerbated in the hearing instrument industry because very
few companies are listed on stock markets. Of the major companies only Oticon, Phonak and
ReSound are quoted. The implication is that neither data on the individual non-quoted
companies are available nor their (official) interpretation of the market situation in annual
reports and the like. 
Our solution to this problem of lack of market share data has been to try to obtain market
share figures from a variety of sources. Generally, we have not been very successful.18 R liable
data on market shares are not publicly available except for occasional (and incommensurable)
market analyses like Frost & Sullivan (1994). The North American market is the best described
market (and that certainly biases our analysis towards America) but even for that market,
reliable longitudinal data on market shares are not available. Furthermore, to our knowledge
academic treatments of the industry are non-existent.
We would like to emphasize that all information about industry structure and behavior used in
this study is publicly available, or at least is well known to people in the industry.
19 12% of net sales was what ReSound, according to its 10K filing, spent on R&D in 1996. Oticon
spent 9% the same year. These two companies being among the most “aggressive” technologically,
we suspect that 12% is a good estimate of the upper bound of R&D intensities in the industry, at least
among the bigger companies. The lower limit is much harder to determine.
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3 Stability, maturity and innovation
It is the stability described in section 2 that we take as a challenge to explain. But why would
we at all be surprised to find a stable industry? After all, many industries remain stable over a
long period. For one thing, is it a widespread opinion, ranging from recent business economists
(D’Aveni, 1995) to more vintage economics studies (Gort, 1963; Caves & Porter, 1978) that
industries with strong emphasis on R&D and technological development are more prone to be
turbulent. And indeed, the hearing instrument industry is an R&D intensive industry, with
companies spending up to 12% of sales on R&D.19 One reason for spending so much probably
is the rich opportunities for technological development which has challenged the industry in the
form of e.g. smaller and better integrated circuits for signal processing, smaller and better
transducers and batteries, more powerful software plus an expanded fundamental understand-
ing of sound and hearing.
So the hearing industry might stand out as an exception to a normal pattern (as far as we can
identify a “normal pattern” below). We might, therefore, study the hearing instruments industry
because of an interest in studying the unexpected, the anomaly, in order to test the validity of
generally accepted relationships. To do so, we need to probe deep into the mechanisms
accounting for the evolution of industry structure. In fact, the literature still has very little to
say about the mechanisms providing for stability versus turbulence. The few studies in this area
have provided statistical correlations, but we still have no comprehensive theory of why some
industries are stable and others turbulent. In this sense, observed stability needs explanation as
well as turbulence does. This is our primary intention in this analysis.
Many forces interact to produce an industry structure. Some of these forces are “destructive”
(to borrow from Schumpeter), potentially breaking down existing structures and giving way to
new. Others are “conservative”, creating inertia and supporting status quo. The final outcome
for an industry depends on the relative strengths of destructive and conservative forces. 
In this section, we are looking for predictions on when to expect stability or turbulence in an
industry, paying special attention to the relation between industry structure and technology.
Thereby we try to identify conditions under which technology should be expected to create
turbulence. We draw upon three different bodies of research: First, we extract results on the
relationship from industrial organization. These suggest possible explanations for turbulence on
the industry-level. But they do not identify the mechanisms by which these factors impact
industry structure. We therefore, secondly, present the product life cycle as one, more detailed
conceptualization of the relationship. And thirdly, we deal with the direct relation between an
20 See Cohen (1995) for a discussion of the so-called Schumpeterian hypothesis on the influence of
market structure (concentration) on innovative activity (not to be confused with Schumpeter’s .
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Figure 1: Main causal relations in the S-C-P framework (performance omitted)
innovation of a specific kind and the industry structure. As these perspectives apply different
units of analysis, we take them as complementary rather than competing perspectives.
Industrial organization
No academic field is dedicated exclusively to the study of “the dynamics of industry structure”.
The economic discipline of “industrial organization“ (IO) has industries as its unit of analysis,
but – as we will discuss below – IO is not rich in conjectures on the development of market
structure over time. 
The treatment of technology in economic theory is usually to take the development of
technology as given (unexplained), and to study the impact of technical change on phenomena
such as employment and income distribution. In the studies of technology and industries, the
main conceptual framework of industrial organization, is that of the so-called Structure-
Conduct-Performance (S-C-P) paradigm (Scherer & Ross, 1990). According to this frame-
work, technology is part of the “basic conditions” that determines the industry structure, which
in turn determines the behavior of the companies in the industry. An example of the logic is the
results of economies of scale: If an industry is applying a technology that displays large
economies of scale, it is unlikely that many companies can coexist in that industry. The
structure will be one of a few companies, if not just one. The behavior of these companies will
in turn be oligopolistic, if not monopolistic. Figure 1 illustrates this line of causation, emphasiz-
ing the traditional focus of industrial economics on pricing behavior.
This is a very naive model, and an elaborated version of the S-C-P framework would stress the
feedback mechanisms, that is, ways in which behavior influences structure and technology. The
literature of industrial organization discusses numerous examples of behavior affecting
structure, most of them concerning entry: Pricing may deter entry, building excess capacity
may preempt profitable production possibilities, and setting high quality standards may raise
rivals’ costs. Also, attempts have been made to explain the rate and direction of technological
development by structure, cf. the so-called Schumpeterian hypothesis.20
Focusing on for explanations for the evolution of industry structure, the logic of the S-C-P
21 A CR2 (the combined market share of the two leading companies) of, say, 90% may be the result
both of the two companies having each a market share of 45% and of one having 80% and the other
10%. An (reverse) example of this may be the Internet browser market with Microsoft quickly
gaining share from Netscape. That particular market would not qualify as a stable market, despite a
stable CR2 and no entry.
22 As Caves & Porter (1977) put it: “The theory of entry barriers has been limited unnecessarily by
confining itself to the movement of firms form zero output to positive outputs. It becomes much
richer – yet remains determinate – when set forth as a general theory of the mobility of firms among
segments of an industry, thus encompassing exit and intergroup shifts as well as entry.” (p. 241.)
This perspective further lead Caves & Porter to define the concept of “strategic groups”, that is,
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framework points at the basic conditions as the place to look. And, indeed, technological
developments may often change economies of scale – and specifically the minimum efficient
scale (MES) of production – explaining some changes in structure. For example, a natural
monopoly may disappear and allow entry if new technologies allow efficient production in
smaller scale or if a market expansion allows more companies to produce at MES. And
generally, the concept of “entry barriers” has an important bearing on industry structure: If
entry barriers are low and there is a profit to be made, entry will occur, and the industry
structure will become more fragmented. If barriers to entry are high (as in the case of a natural
monopoly), no entry will take place, and the industry will not get more fragmented. 
A large number of empirical IO studies have focused on entry, that is, analyzing how many
new firms are entering specific industries. A good reason for this focus on new firms is the
availability of census data on entry. Another strand of IO studies is analyses of concentration,
that is, how much production is carried out by the biggest firms. Cross-section studies of
concentration are relatively frequent, and provide insight into the determinants of market
concentration (MES being an important example). 
With entry and concentration we have two important ingredients of stability and turbulence.
But since stability and turbulence inherently are dynamic concepts, we need longitudinal
studies, and unfortunately these, especially those of concentration, are rare, hindered as they
are by data problems. 
And even longitudinal concentration-studies would not capture the full flavor of stability
versus turbulence. An industry with no entry and exit and the same concentration ratio over
time might in fact be a very turbulent industry: The same group of companies could change
relative size over time in such a way that it would not be registered in the concentration ratio.21
Only very few studies have gone beyond the mere registration of changes in concentration
ratios over time.
And yet, the concept of stability should encompass all these elements: It should include entry
and exit, and it should include also an enhanced version of concentration studies, taking into
consideration changes in market share positions among incumbents.22 Turbulence (as the flip-
companies following similar strategies. Under the influence of Porter (1980), the companion term
“mobility barriers” came to describe barriers to mobility between strategic groups. While mobility
between strategic groups does contribute to overall industry turbulence, it remains only part of the
concept of turbulence.
23 It seem reasonable to expect R&D to be a more powerful disrupting force than advertising. With e.g.
Sutton (1991, p. 314) it might be argued that the image of a company created by advertising may be
carried over from one product generation to the next, providing the company with a competitive
advantage largely independent of products. Changes in competitive positions based on changes in
advertising therefore probably are relatively smooth. Contrary, a product innovation may immedi-
ately override the competitive position established on technology outdated by the new innovation.
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side of stability) was introduced as the appropriate term by Beedsley & Hamilton (1984) to be
applied, though, only to entries and exits in that study, but Acs & Audretsch (1990) included
also expansion and contractions of incumbents under this label.
While the term “turbulence” therefore is of recent date, the interest in the subject matter goes
back more than 30 years. The stream of results is so “thin”, however, that hardly no general
results can be extracted. Comparing results from e.g. Gort (1963), Caves & Porter (1978), Acs
& Audretsch (1990) and Davies & Geroski (1997) is difficult because of differences in
populations studied (time and location) and because of differences in measures of turbulence as
well as models and statistical techniques. Actually, none of the independent variables have the
same sign of coefficient in all four studies. 
Nonetheless, Davies & Geroski (1997) succeeds in drawing at least two interesting, though
still preliminary, conclusions that are not totally at odds with the other studies: First, that
“while concentration is typically fairly stable, this stability conceals considerable turbulence in
market shares among leading firms” (p. 389), and second, that advertising, and (to a lesser
degree) R&D and innovation plays a major role “in affecting both concentration levels and
industry turbulence” (p. 389). That is, the more advertising and R&D, the more concentrated
and at the same time more turbulent industries. 
This result is partially at odds with Caves & Porter (1978). In terms of levels of instability.
They found that high product R&D intensive industries are more turbulent than low product
R&D intensive industries, while there are no difference in turbulence in low and high advertis-
ing intensive industries (p. 303).23 Moreover, it seems as if product R&D is more effective in
creating turbulence in highly concentrated industries. So while we may be skeptical about the
role of advertising as a driving force in market share variation, the effect of product innova-
tions seems to be corroborated in these statistical analyses.
Unfortunately, none of the studies were designed to identify the mechanisms through which
advertising and R&D actually influences turbulence (in particular, it is an interesting observa-
tion from the Davies & Geroski study that advertising and R&D at the same time prevents
entry from newcomers and allows for turbulence among incumbents, an observation that we
24 Generally, the referred statistical studies are not very explicit about such mechanisms. They rarely
build on any elaborate idea of how the variables inter-correlate. However, to the degree that the
empirical studies manage to establish “stylized facts”, these mechanisms may be construed after-
wards. Dosi et al. (1995) and Klepper (1996) are examples of such efforts.
25 These studies do not strictly follow the traditional IO framework of causal relations (Scherer & Ross,
1990). “It is not certain where share variation fits into the traditional industrial organization
trichotomy of industry structure, behavior, and performance” (Ogur, 1976, p. 1). Originally intended
as a measure of industry performance in the line of anti-trust oriented research, market share
variation may be seen as proxy for the strength of competitive forces, that is, “diminished variation
may suggest the presence of conspiracy” (Ogur, 1976, p. 3). But share variation may also be
interpreted as part of industry behavior. Incumbents may well try to behave in ways that both aims at
precluding entry and to reduce volatility in the distribution of market shares. An example of the
latter may be a cartel that “freezes” industry structure. And finally, share variation may be argued to
belong to “structure”, if it is a direct consequence of buyer and seller characteristics (which it is in
Stigler’s theory of oligopoly (Stigler, 1968)). Accordingly, in our attempt to understand stability in
the hearing instrument industry, we will entertain a whole range of explanations, not limiting
ourselves to one of these perspectives.
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return to below).24 
The product life cycle
So while it seems safe to conclude that technological development increases the volatility in
market shares, the IO25 studies do not spell out the mechanisms behind this relationship. And
probably a comprehensive model for the interaction between the evolution of industry structure
and industry behavior, especially regarding advertising and R&D is not available (and will not
be in the foreseeable future). We are therefore left with more or less well documented
conceptualizations about these relationships. The “product life cycle” is one such. Stemming
from a marketing management perspective (see Levitt, 1965), William Abernathy and James
Utterback in the late 1970's (Utterback & Abernathy, 1975; Abernathy & Utterback, 1978)
enhanced the marketing concept of a product life cycle into a broader “model” of industry
evolution. Specifically, they added two important dimensions to the product life cycle: First,
they argued that the transition into a mature stage was accompanied by the emergence of a
“dominant product design”, and second, they hypothesized a specific pattern of product and
process innovative activity over the cycle.
The generality of the product life cycle is hotly disputed, but, again, in the absence of better
alternatives, the idea has survived and has been applied to a number of industries. For example,
Abernathy & Clark (1985) examines the automobile industry, and while Utterback & Suárez
(1993) and Suárez & Utterback (1995) compare seven industries in depth, Gort and Klepper
(1982) examined 46 products through the lenses of the product life cycle. It is widely acknowl-
edged that only products with opportunities for both product and process innovations may
follow the product life cycle (Klepper, 1996, p. 565). This excludes on the one hand e.g.
standard petrochemical products that do not undergo product innovations over time, and on
the other hand those customized products, as specialty machinery, for which process innova-
tions are almost irrelevant.
26 Abernathy & Utterback (1978) use three stages, Gort & Klepper (1982) use five.
27 Note that the “height” of innovation, that is, the degree of improvement in performance of the new
technology over the old, does not directly influence an innovation’s effect on turbulence. Indirectly,
though, it is conceivable that innovations with strong effects on performance will also influence
industry stability because minor under-performance in one area (e.g. product performance) may be
compensated by an increased effort in another area (e.g. marketing). Also, since barriers to imita-
tion/adoption seldom are unsurmountable (even strong patents often can be “invented around”), but
rather a matter of time and patience, companies often will have a chance to catch up if they are
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Based on this criteria, hearing instruments seem to be an obvious candidate for a product life
cycle study. Furthermore, the industry lives up to the predictions of the “model” of the
emergence of a dominant design (or rather two, BTE and ITE), and a stable industry structure.
In a product life cycle of the four stages26 of “introduction / development”, “growth”, “matu-
rity” and “decline” (Levitt, 1965; Porter, 1980), the hearing instrument industry in the period
studied here fits the mature stage best.
The predictions (summed up in Porter, 1980) on structure and behavior in the mature stage,
however, only partly fit the industry: The market has not become a mass-market, emphasis on
production costs does not seem to be an essential feature of the industry, competition is not
focused on price, margins do not seem to be decreasing, and shakeout is not happening. And
most importantly, product innovation is probably the most essential competitive dimension of
the industry (elaborated in section 4).
So what we have is an industry that apparently does not follow the standard predictions, but
sticks to its own logic: Its structure remains stable despite heavy competition on product
innovations.
Product innovation as an engine of change in structure
But does technological change – and especially product innovations – necessarily need to be
destructive (in the Schumpeterian sense) and create turbulence by allowing new companies into
the industry, and perhaps even trigger a new product life cycle and coin a new industry? Or to
use the expression from Abernathy & Clark (1985, p. 18): What can cause the “de-maturity” of
an industry? 
If an innovation causes turbulence in an industry, and especially if it induces entry, it seems
logical to infer that this particular innovation (or its imitation/adoption) poses non-trivial
challenges to incumbents. On the other hand, if an innovation does not lead to turbulence and
entry, the innovation probably has been easier to handle for incumbents. That amounts to
saying that some innovations builds on the competencies that established firms must have
already in order to be active in the industry, while other innovations require additional
competencies and even may render incumbents’ competencies obsolete. The “destructive”
power of an innovation therefore depends on how “different” the competencies related to the
new technology is from the competencies of the old technology.27
allowed time and capital. But the bigger the advantage of the new technology, the more difficult it
will be to regain lost positions the industry. Therefore, it should be expected that while the degree of
“difference” in competencies required for its imitation/adoption is the major determinant of an
innovation’s disruptive effect, the height of the innovation will amplify this impact.
28  See e.g. Tushman & Anderson (1986) and Anderson & Tushman (1990).
21
In a number of papers, Tushman and Anderson28 have pursued this idea by proposing the
dichotomy of competence-enhancing and competence-destroying technological discontinuities
(innovations). Only if innovations tend to destroy existing competencies in the industry, are we
to expect entering firms to be able to out-compete incumbents. Although it is clear that what
ultimately determines a company’s chances of survival is its competencies (in this relation,
competencies to create, imitate or adopt architectural innovations), it is also clear that the
identification of such competencies is not an easy task. Technology is a truly multifaceted
entity, and company competencies are probably even more so. To approach the question of the
degree of difference between competencies directly, without a well-defined categorization or
typology of competencies, therefore seems difficult and subject to great subjectivity. Even if a
one-by-one assessment of each innovation turns out to split a sample of innovations in two
relatively distinct types (as it apparently does in the samples of Tushman & Anderson), such a
method is very difficult to replicate by other researchers on other samples (or even the same). 
Another attempt attacks the question from the technical side, trying to identify features of an
innovation that may cause disturbance. This is the approach of Henderson & Clark (1990),
who distinguish between two types of potentially disruptive innovations: Radical innovations
and architectural innovation. While the radical innovation is defined as one which changes both
the “core concepts” (e.g. components or basic technologies) and the linkages between these
concepts (that is, the architecture of the product), then the architectural innovation “only”
changes the linkages between core concepts, “recycling” the elements. (These two types of
innovations are compared to two other types, modular innovations and incremental innova-
tions, which are not expected to have disruptive effects.)
Henderson & Clark (ibid.) argue that both radical and architectural innovations often create
difficulties for established firms and that they may even redefine the industry, but somewhat
contrary to expectations, they also argue that architectural innovations are potentially more
disruptive than radical innovations. While a radical innovation “creates unmistakable chal-
lenges” (ibid., p. 13) and therefore calls for immediate action, architectural innovations are
more subtle in the sense that “(m)uch of what the firm knows is useful and needs to be applied
in the new product, but some of what it knows is not only not useful but may actually handicap
the firm” (ibid., p. 13). This may be a confusing situation and even if the problem is correctly
comprehended it may be difficult to handle, as major parts of the company’s competencies and
organization may be structured around a specific architecture of the product. The company
needs to re-build its architectural knowledge, that is, the knowledge that allows the company
to understand and improve the linkages between the elements of a product. But “(b)ecause
22
(established firms’) architectural knowledge is embedded in channels, filters, and strategies, the
discovery process and the process of creating new information (and rooting out the old)
usually takes time” (ibid., p. 18). So while the competencies for improving core elements of a
product may be readily identified (and if not easily then often at least possibly replaced), then
the competencies needed for architectural innovation are both more difficult to identify and to
replace.
Whether Henderson & Clark are right in conjecturing that architectural innovations are more
disruptive than radical innovations should be left for an empirical test (if testable at all, see
below), but the idea that the changes in architecture (or basic design) may create more
turbulence among competitors than changes in the elements of the product is one step towards
an understanding of the influence of technology on industry structure. And it corresponds well
with the idea of a dominant design whose emergence often seems to lead to considerabe exits
from an industry.
Summing up upon the two approaches, Anderson & Tushman focus on the competencies
needed for a specific innovation, that is, characteristics not of the innovation directly, but of
some requirements to produce it. Henderson & Clark attempt to identify features of the
innovation itself that may cause changes in industry structure. The two approaches clearly are
not mutually exclusive: The Henderson & Clark acknowledges that in the end, it is the
endowment of competencies that determines a company’s commercial success, but instead of
attempting a direct identification of the relevant competencies, Henderson & Clark claim that
some technological changes are of a kind that inevitably must challenges incumbents as much
(or even more) as they challenge entrants. While such an approach clearly is a roundabout
“detour” compared to the approach of Tushman & Anderson (and possibly only a first step
towards a full understanding of the relationship between technology and industry structure), it
does make sense if we have better chances of analyzing technologies than competencies. That
is the case, in our opinion, not the least because researchers seldom have access to internal
studies of all (or most) companies in an industry. In a study of the impact of technological
change on industry structure, the advantage of the Henderson & Clark approach is that a
researcher can study technology in its instrumental sense in order to operationalize the
explanatory variable, while in the Tushman & Anderson approach the study must deal directly
with (that is, somehow measure) competencies in incumbent firms and in entrants for old and
new technology, respectively. The disadvantage of the Henderson & Clark approach is that it
reduces explanations to only one dimension of technological change (architectural or not), and
is as such inherently is reductionistic.
In section 4.3 of this report, we try to characterize technological change in the hearing
instrument industry, arguing that its particular characteristics did not allow for neither much
entry nor much variation in market shares. But before we present our analysis of this and other
aspects of the hearing industry during the last 25 years, we will briefly sketch one of the events
that marked the passage from the old “regime” to the one prevailing now:
29 It is all too tempting to use our knowledge of the impact of the innovation on competition and market
structure in classifying innovations, but obviously that leads us into a tautology: We cannot classify
one variable that is supposed to affect a second variable on the basis of its impact on this same,
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Starkey’s entry into the industry coincided with the introduction of an important innovation,
the in-the-ear (ITE) instrument, which – as we have described – turned out to become a
dominant design alongside with the BTE instrument. The innovation was made possible by the
ever decreasing size of components, and technically, an ITE instrument is little more that
standard components packaged in another type of case. Already in the 1950s many companies
developed ITE instruments, but they never succeeded in the marketplace. So Starkey was not
the first company to produce an ITE instrument, but Starkey as a small, up-coming company
entering the field did succeed.
Therefore (as seems to be the rule in this industry) it took only a couple of years before
competitors were able to produce similar products, if they did not carry ITE products already.
But still only Starkey succeeded in commercializing ITE instruments. If the basic lay-out of an
ITE instrument did not diverge much from a BTE instrument, organizationally it required a
shift from to-the-shelf production to customized production, since every ITE case has to be
moulded to the individual customer, and components have to be arranged in order to fit the
specific case. Starkey, new as manufacturer but well established already as dispenser of hearing
instruments, was able to set up an organization that could handle this problem. That turned out
to be more difficult to handle for the existing companies. They had little technical problems in
developing another ITE instrument, but many problems in changing their internal organization.
So while this innovation was only modestly new in technical terms, it required an all new
logistics system which was not “compatible” with incumbents’ logistics systems.
Here we probably have a pretty clean example of an innovation that was not at all “radical”. It
did not challenge the use of existing “core concepts”, especially in the field of components.
Neither did it challenge the fundamental linkages between these components (although it
turned out that “feed-back” problems increased with the shorter distance between microphone
and speaker in an ITE instrument). The challenge was a truly organizational question: How to
set up a logistic system that could efficiently handle customized production? With most
technological competencies acquired in the production of BTE instruments still highly relevant,
it may have seemed to be a “piece-of-cake” for the incumbents to cope with the challenge from
Starkey initially. But as Henderson & Clark suggest, the fact that most of the more visible
competencies are still relevant may actually distract attention from the fact that an underlying
condition for competition has changed, leading incumbents to downplay the importance of the
innovation, and thereby allowing the innovator considerable lead-time. 
We would not pretend, either, that we could have predicted the disruptive power of the ITE
innovation by classifying it as an architectural innovation. Only after it happened, with
hindsight, we – and the actors – understand the difficulties in organizational restructuring.29 It
second variable. We, thus, need a more precise operationalization (independent of industry structure)
of the different classes of innovations before we can conduct more rigorous studies of the relations
between technology and the evolution of market structure.
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certainly is possible ex ante to think of conspicuously disruptive innovations in the hearing
instrument industry: One such would be the ability to regenerate hair-cells in the ear. If the
hair-cells can be reestablished, the person may regain the ability of hearing. Not only would
such an innovation be competence-destroying, it would probably be industry-destroying
altogether. But the continuum between the “innocent” innovation and such a “destructive”
innovation must be described also. The problem of operationalizing innovation as a variable,
that is distinguishing architectural from non-architectural innovations, therefore, prevents
rigorous testing of the Henderson & Clark hypothesis, and leave this field of research without
much predictive power. But hopefully that situation will change with more research in this
area.
The example of Starkey also illustrates how important it is to take a broad perspective on the
relation between technology and the evolution of industry structure. A narrow definition of
technology may preclude us from understanding fundamental aspects of change. This is
basically the reason why we in section 4 make an effort in covering a wide range of aspects of
the industry, not exclusively dealing with technology narrowly defined.
A precautionary remark should be made before turning to the case. With only a rudimentary
theory on the evolution of industry structure and dealing with only one case, the nature of our
study still is very explorative. We do not in any sense pretend to prov causal relationships in
this report. But, for one thing, we can advance possible, novel explanations and, for another,
our study may prove as inspiration for hypotheses testing.
To sum up and lay out the plan for the remaining parts of the report, the purpose of this study
is to identify those factors that account for the prevailing stability in the hearing instrument
industry, an industry with only minor changes in structure over a period of approximately 25
years. We conduct a broad-ranging analysis of technology, not only on manufacturing level of
the value chain, but also in adjacent stages, and of competitive behavior of the companies in
the industry. After the analysis of the past 25 years in section 4, we shall in section 5 discuss
possible challenges to stability. 
30 The author does remark, however, that this figure probably is a minor underestimation since the
market analyses did not include nursing homes etc. More importantly, though, is that the degree of
hearing loss among these 10% varies a lot. According to the National Center for Health Statistics,
out of an estimated 20,3 million people with hearing trouble in 1991, only 4,8 million cannot hear
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4 Stabilizing factors
In this section we examine the factors which can account for stability. The section is organized
along the lines of the value-chain of the hearing instrument industry, starting from the down-
stream end with end-users, moving up-stream through dispensers and hearing instruments
manufacturers to component suppliers. At each of these four levels we identify factors that
influence stability in our central analytical object, namely the hearing instrument industry. The
supply chain of the industry can be depicted as follows:
Table 3
Value chain of the hearing instrument industry
Level Component supplierHearing instrument
manufacturers
Dispensers End-users
Role Components deliv-
ered:
* Transducers
(microphones and
receivers)
* Electro-mechani-
cal components
(switches, volume
controls, trim-
mers)
* Amplifiers
* Hybrids
* Batteries
* Assembly compo-
nents into hearing
instruments - some
(ITE and ITC) are
made-to-order,
some (BTE) can be
kept in stock.
* The primary con-
cern of this level is
signal processing
technology and
insight into audio-
logy.
* Measure hearing
impairment, make
audiograms, take
imprints of end-
user’s ear, order
the hearing instru-
ment from manu-
facturer and when
received fit it to
the particular
hearing impair-
ment. Service the
instruments and
sell batteries. The
system varies
among countries;
e.g. public in DK
related to hospi-
tals, private in D
and the US
through retailers.
* Those who wear
hearing instru-
ments go to a dis-
penser to be mea-
sured, advised, and
fitted in relation to
the purchase of a
hearing aid. End
users are typically
elderly people and
those impaired
from work-related
noise.
4.1 End-users
Is has been said about hearing instruments, that at least 5% of the world population need them,
but nobody wants them. While this is not all true (still 5 mill. units are sold every year world-
wide), there is something to it, and the industry has for long struggled to figured out why.
Market analysts repeatedly claim that only a fraction of potential users actually do wear a
hearing instrument. Kochkin (1997) sums up a series of market analyses and finds that the
incidence of hearing loss in the American population is roughly 10%.30 Of this population only
and understand normal speech (Sándor, 1994).
31 Machan (1996) tells the, presumably not uncommon, story of why her $3,600 pair of ITC hearing
instruments are now sitting in their case.
32 26% of potential users did not buy a hearing instrument in 1991 for that reason; another 17% of
potential users did not buy a hearing instrument due to lack of awareness of own hearing loss
(Skafte, 1996).
33 As of writing, President Clinton is announced to have a hearing loss, and is being fitted a pair of
instruments. Newspapers claim that it has immediately increased sales (Hendren, 1997).
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between a fifth and a quarter are actually users of a hearing instrument. The penetration figures
even seem to have been relatively stable over the course of the last decade (Reuters, 1996).
The situation apparently is the same in other countries, such as Denmark and Japan (Morgen-
avisen Jyllandsposten, 1997; Aktuel Elektronik, 1996). Such stability is typically explained by a
market being saturated. However, is the market for hearing instruments saturated, and is there
any means of increasing penetration? In this section we shall try to shed light on these
questions, focusing on product quality, problems of getting used to the instruments, stigma,
and price.
Product quality and stigma
First, no hearing instrument can correct a hearing loss completely. That is, a hearing instru-
ment cannot repair the defects of the ear, but it can compensate for some of the lost hearing.
The quality of the instruments is therefore important to market penetration. The better hearing
instruments, the more hard-of-hearing persons will be willing to use them. But as of today,
hearing instruments still are only (a distant) second-best to normal hearing. This is, of course, a
major challenge for manufacturers.
Second, it takes time to get accustomed to the device. Typically the period of getting-used-to-
it will last approximately 6 months. Specifically, those who have not heard anything prior to
getting a hearing instrument may have severe difficulty getting used to suddenly hearing the
refrigerator "humming", the birds singing, and so on. Some hard-of-hearing people do not have
the patience for this or are not informed of this fact when buying it, thus concluding that the
hearing instrument is of no use or perhaps even stressful. This is particularly so in cases where
the hearing instrument is inappropriately fitted to the particular hearing impairment. Many a
hearing instrument has ended up in the drawer - often much to the regret of family members
and close friends.31
Third, stigma is a very important barrier for persons with a hearing loss to buy a hearing
instrument.32 This is underscored by the observation that hearing instrument sales increased
when Ronald Reagan first had a hearing instrument fitted in 1983, when he switched to an in-
the-canal hearing instrument in 1986, and when Miss America of 1994 bolstered the image of
those using hearing instruments as she herself wore one (Skafte, 1996).33 The typical associa-
34 Kochkin’s analysis covers ITE instruments in the US. We have added the Danish observation.
35 Price elasticities from -1 to 0 are generally considered low.
36 Volume changes are always relative. Here we discuss the relation between price and volume, and –
compared to other industries – a change in price in the hearing instrument industry does not produce
a big change in volume. That is not to say that the industry would not consider a doubling of volume
very attractive, especially if prices did not have to be lowered to obtain this, but this is apparently not
viable under the present demand structure.
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tions with hearing instruments are that they are for old people, for not-so-smart people, or for
people who are out of touch with their environment (work, family etc.). 
Price elasticity
Fourth, apart from stigma and
problems of use, there might be
a pricing-based explanation:
Would lower prices expand this
market (and would higher prices
contract it)? And as important:
Does it pay to change prices?
Figure 2 is based on the meticu-
lous market research carried out
by Sergei Kochkin. Observations
from his MarkeTrak III analysis
(Kochkin, 1992) are used to
construct a demand schedule.34
The schedule is anchored in the
empirical observation of 0.6
units sold per 100 inhabitants at the average price of $800. In the US annual sales were about
1.6 million units in 1995. With a population of 260 million, the number of dispensed units was
roughly 0.6 per 100 inhabitants.
The price elasticity (the relative change (percent) in volume as a result of a relative change
(percent) in price) is rather low. It ranges from –0.1 in the lowest price bracket to –0.8 in the
highest price bracket.35 Price reductions therefore do not open very large new markets.
Halving the price from $800 to $400 would increase the market by 48%, and almost free
hearing instruments (priced at only $100) would barely double the number of units sold. On the
other hand, higher prices will not eliminate much demand. Increased prices have a relatively
large impact on volume, but still a $300 increase on top of a price of $800 (a 37.5% increase)
will only scare away less than 20 percent of the customers (Kochkin, 1992).36
The ensuing effects on turnover and profitability of price changes are relatively straightfor-
ward: Growth in unit volume cannot compensate for lower prices, and it therefore does not
37 This may explain the emphasis on pricing strategies in Kochkin’s (1992) article: Sergei Kochkin is
employed at Knowles, which is one of the largest suppliers to the industry (see section 4.4). Maybe
Knowles would like the producers to scale up production by reducing price in order to demand more
components from suppliers. But when demand is inelastic the hearing aids producers can earn more
by raising prices and accepting reduced output.
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pay for the industry as a whole to lower prices. On the contrary, somewhat higher prices
probably will increase profits (Kochkin (1992) seems to agree on this). It should be noted that
prices are retail-prices and that we therefore analyze the dispenser-level. Since the ultimate
end-user demand schedule is the same for manufacturers also, and dispenser-prices generally
are marked-up manufacturer-prices, probably the same results would apply to the manufacture-
level. Whether it holds for component suppliers is not so obvious. Due to economies of scale
and an even more inelastic demand for their products, suppliers of some components may
actually prefer manufacturers to pursue a low-price-high-volume strategy to a high-price-low-
volume strategy.37
Figure 2 includes a data-point for Denmark also. In this country, hearing instruments are free
(price is zero for end-users). In 1995 60,000 units was dispensed to a total population of some
5 million (Aktuel Elektronik, 1996). That yields 1.2 units per 100 inhabitants. It is interesting
that the observation fits so well with the estimated demand curve for the American market.
Even the position – which is a bit too much to the left in the diagram to fit the US demand
schedule – may be explained by the fact that the Danish quantity probably is underestimated
compared to a situation of free hearing instruments, since in a third-party-payer situation,
hearing instruments are typically subject to a rationing (queuing) arrangement which obviously
limits the dispensed number of units.
The identification of an absolute, upper limit to sales of hearing instruments makes sense in
that a hearing instrument, unlike many other products, is of a kind that you only buy one (or
two) of at a time. What this analysis tells us is simply that it is difficult to imagine more than a
doubling in volume (assuming present-state technology and unsolved stigma problems),
measured in units, even if hearing instruments become totally free for the end-users. Given the
present quality of the instruments, the stigma attached to wearing them, and problems of fitting
etc. the market is a limited one.
That there is a natural limit to the number of units sold, does not imply, however, that revenues
in the hearing instrument industry cannot be increased. As the inelasticity of demand indicates,
there is a market for more expensive instruments, and if these instruments also improve quality,
solve some stigma-related problems and/or are easier to fit, then the demand curve may well
shift to the right, increasing demand. One might in fact interpret the manufacturers’ strategies
of spending heavily on developing digital instruments (seeking improved quality) and smaller
instruments (relaxing stigma problems) as ways of exploiting this possibility. These are
probably much wiser strategies than trying to lower prices. Only in case of major economies of
38 Assuming (somewhat arbitrarily) that it now costs $400 to produce a hearing instrument, a simple
calculation based on the data from figure 2 says that if absolute profits should remain the same after
a $200 decrease in price and the ensuing increase in quantity from 0.6 to 0.75, costs would have to
be reduced to $280: A 30% cost reduction caused by a 25% increase in quantity!
39 Apparently, hearing care is increasingly included in American employee benefit plans and HMO
plans (Employee Benefit Plan Review, 1997)
29
scale in the production of hearing instruments, the increased number of units would be able to
prevent profits per unit to fall. And such economies seem unlikely.38
A conclusion on this discussion of price elasticity and the possibilities of increasing penetration
is that high prices do keep some but not many customers away, and that, given the existing
demand schedule, a boost in sales can only be profitable if third-party payment becomes wide-
spread.39 And even in that case there are limits to the impact on volume: First, even with truly
free hearing instruments, the increase in volume would not be dramatic, and second, the
necessary third-party payer will probably always establish some rationing, threshold and/or co-
payment system, limiting even further the increase.
Thus, we see four main reasons for the limited penetration of the market: Quality of the
instruments, problems in fitting and getting-used-to the instrument, and stigma. The price of
the hearing instrument seems to play only a minor role for penetration.
If part of these problems stem from lack of information on the merits of hearing instruments
(which is certainly not an unreasonable expectation), one obvious way of alleviating these
factors limiting the market (shifting the demand function to the right) is advertising. In most
countries, however, advertisements for hearing instruments are limited. It seems as if pull-
effects is not much used in the industry (that is, manufacturers’ marketing vis-à-vis end-users
to have them "pull" the product through the dispensers). Generally, it seems as if the market is
relatively insensitive to marketing efforts (Starkey, 1997). We will discuss this question further
in section 4.3.
A way of overcoming buyer stigma and problems in getting used to using hearing instruments
is counseling of end-users. It is generally accepted that counseling is an important factor in
hearing instrument purchase, use and acceptance (Crandell, McDermott & Pugh, 1996).
Specifically,
"..even limited amounts of counseling significantly decreased the three problems most often
cited by the elderly as reasons for not using amplification [that is, a hearing instrument]. These
problems included perceptual difficulties in background noise [e.g. speaking with one person in
a cocktail party], dexterity concerns [making it difficult to use the volume control and switch of
app. 3.5 mm in diameter] and the belief that their hearing loss was not significant enough to
warrant a hearing instrument" (ibid, p. 26)
40 In fact, even in the US, a federal regulation prohibits the sale of a hearing instrument unless the
buyer has first received a medical evaluation from a licensed physician. That requirement, however,
is frequently waived.
41 There are some US mail-order companies selling very cheap hearing instruments (down to $30).
However, they seem to represent only a marginal part of the market for hearing instruments, and do
not compete directly with standard instruments. They may, however, because of poor quality and lack
of customized fitting contribute to the general impression of hearing instruments as not being able to
alleviate hearing losses.
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For counseling to be credible in a situation with strong information asymmetries, the counselor
probably needs to be independent of parties with economic interests in the sale of the hearing
instruments. Most hard-of hearing persons will therefore want to consult a physician (or even
an audiologist) before buying a hearing instrument.40 But a on-dispensing physician or
audiologist rarely can recommend a specific brand of instrument, as most hearing losses differ,
and the range of available models is large and ever-changing. The choice of brand and model
thus is very much in the hands of the dispensers. Their dealing with the credibility problem may
vary, but one standard solution is to carry more than one brand, signaling independence from a
specific manufacturer. This explains the structure of the dispensing industry, an issue that we
return to in section 4.2.
This whole situation limits the chances for new market opportunities. It is hard to imagine
entirely new types of customer-segments. With end-user preferences stable and well known by
manufacturers, it is all the more likely that no one company (incumbent or entrant) will be so
lucky as to find a niche that can seriously alter the balance of power in the industry. This
certainly seems to be the situation, as Kochkin (1996) remarks: “over the last 10 years it is
apparent that little has changed in terms of new markets or new customer segments”.
4.2 Dispensers
The dispenser is here used as a common denominator for different types of mediators between
hearing instrument manufacturers and the end-user. Dispensers are the distribution level in
hearing instruments. Mostly, dispensers order instruments directly with manufacturers (or their
local subsidiary). Wholesale is not common in hearing instruments.
Therefore, dispensers are retailers who sell and fit hearing instruments very much like opticians
and optometrists sell glasses. Worldwide, there are a number of different types of dispensers.
In the US they are either audiologists (who have an academic training) or hearing aids
specialists (who have approx. 6 months training), in Germany dispensers are audiologists, in
the UK free hearing aids are distributed by the hospitals (while some specialist stores offer full
priced hearing instruments), and in Scandinavia the public hearing clinics dispense the
government-paid instruments.41
42 Crandell, McDermott & Pugh (1996, p. 29) further observe that "it appears that few graduate
programs have additional space within their established curricula for further counseling instruction,
suggesting that the status-quo in counseling instruction will likely prevail".
43 The increasing demands on dispensers presumably also is the reason why there has been a significant
shift in balance between dispensing audiologists and hearing aids specialists in the US, the former
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The function of all dispensers is to measure and model in audiograms the particular hearing
impairment; take imprints of the patient’s ear; advice on type of hearing instrument (e.g. in
terms of type, brand, size, signal processing); order that hearing instrument at the particular
manufacturer; receive it and fit it to the particular hearing impairment (depending on the type
of hearing instrument either manually using a screw-driver to position the trimmers, or digitally
by connecting the instrument to a PC or fitting-box). After-sales-services and service-agree-
ments are individually up to the particular dispenser. Dispensers thus provide essential value-
adding in the supply chain (measuring, ordering, fitting, service).
Dispensers as stabilizers
Of 13.3 million potential users in the USA, more than 70% were influenced notto purchase a
hearing instrument either by the professional they consulted or by their lack of trust in that
professional. Similarly, a positive recommendation of a hearing instrument by a hearing
professional is the most important determinant of purchase intent (Kochkin, 1993).
Further, despite the importance of counseling for the sales of hearing instruments (cf. quote in
section 4.1), approximately 80% of "instruction time in hearing instrument classes is devoted
to technological issues in hearing instruments" (Crandell, McDermott & Pugh, 1996) rather
than counseling instruction. This was underscored by Schweitzer (1996) who found that 84%
of surveyed end-users agreed or strongly agreed to the point that "the service and the personal-
ity of the dispenser is as important as the hearing device(s)" (1996, p.14).42
The problem of insufficient knowledge on the side of dispensers is reinforced because the task
environment for dispensers has increased to a highly complex level. That is, the number of
product types has increased, the technology is changing (from analog, over programmable to
digital), there is a wide variety of offerings (multiple programs in one hearing aid,
directionality, other new features), and software programs are becoming integral parts of a
hearing aid and the fitting. These factors interact and make the selection among different types
of hearing instruments a complex decision. Furthermore, trends of programmability and digital
hearing instruments imply that the use of fitting software (often integrated with office and
client management programs) is required for dispensing hearing instruments. Also, hearing
instruments manufacturers’ sales representatives are increasingly required to perform training
sessions as additional education for dispensers to have them consider some of the newer types
of hearing instruments and related technology (software programs). In order to oversee and
deal with this complexity, dispensers stick to the aspects of their work that they know and
slowly take in new tasks as they can.43
taking over market shares from the latter. (The tendency is reported in the annual reports on market
developments in trade magazines such as the Hearing Dealer, Hearing Instruments and the Hearing
Review.) There are now app. 6,000 hearing aid specialists and app. 5,000 dispensing audiologists in
the US.
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Thus, according to the cover story of the Hearing Journal in January 1997 (Kirkwood, 1997):
"Essential as technological advances are to increasing consumer acceptance of and satisfaction
with hearing instruments, these advances are of little value unless fitted by hearing profession-
als with the skills and knowledge to tap their full potential" (ibid., p. 29). Furthermore, Sergei
Kochkin, is quoted for pointing out that the instruments scoring highest in consumer satisfac-
tion "tend to be the advanced programmable hearing instruments". Kochkin adds, "If more
dispensers were to embrace this advanced technology, there would be much more positive
word of mouth. We have to upgrade the dispensing outlet" (ibid., p. 29-30). The distribution
barrier, thus, may be particularly frustrating for companies introducing newer types of hearing
instruments.
The sales barrier at the dispenser level can be related to the lack of tradition for promoting new
hearing instruments through advertising (cf. section 4.3) on the part of hearing instrument
manufacturers. This leaves the sale and choice among products entirely up to the dispenser:
Each hearing loss is unique, and the broad range of instruments have such a high technological
content that the average end-user will not have a clue as to the difference between the various
models. Therefore, hearing instruments cannot be sold without professional counseling,
providing the rationale for a dispenser level.
Links between dispensers and manufacturers
One way of solving the problem of inertia at the dispenser level would obviously be for
manufacturers to take control over dispensers by establishing their own chain of dispensers.
Transaction cost theory would argue for vertical integration on the basis of transaction
frequency, asset specificity, and uncertainty (Williamson, 1985). Assuming that transactions
are frequent and occur under uncertainty, we shall focus on asset specificity and the problem of
“getting incentives right” so that dispensers will undertake the necessary investments in
equipment and training in order to promote hearing instruments from a specific manufacturer
better.
Vertical integration is not unknown in the industry, but the vast majority of dispensers are
legally independent from the hearing instrument manufacturers. This does not mean that the
dispensers carry instruments from every manufacturer. In fact, 58% of US-dispensers carry 3-6
brands (Skafte, 1997). Most dispensers have ties to a couple of manufacturers, from some of
which they may also receive training and education of dispenser staff. However, vertical
integration (or elements of it) is clearly a feature of the manufacturer-owned or manufacturer-
controlled ispensers. The share of more or less vertically integrated dispensers seems to be
around one fifth: Only 18% of US-dispensers carry only 1 brand (Skafte, 1997). An example of
44 The warning was issued to six companies (Dahlberg / Miracle Ear, Electone, Siemens, Omni,
Starkey, and Beltone), but industry sources suggest that it hurt Miracle Ear disproportionally.
45 The analogy to this situation may be the computer network consultancy company that sells a package
of systems design and hardware. Such a company might want to carry hardware components from
different hardware manufacturers in order to signal independence from these.
46 The more well-educated and demanding the customers, the more serious is this concern. Today, with
general access to the Internet with company web-sites presenting (and praising) numerous products,
and with independent consumer information, dispensers may be challenged more than ever.
47 The situation resembles that of advanced Hi-Fi audio equipment for which every fan has his own
idiosyncratic requirements and preferences, not to talk about books or music records. Within such
markets no single manufacturer can cover all types of demand.
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this is the franchise chain of Miracle Ear (franchised by Dahlberg, now Bausch & Lomb) which
was relatively successful in the USA until an FDA-warning in April 1993 (Food and Drug
Administration, 1993) on the use of incorrect information in advertisements caused sales to
plummet.44
There are benefits and drawbacks to both of the types of relations: Independence makes it
difficult for manufacturers to support dispensers, e.g. in advertising and training, because the
manufacturer cannot be sure that his contribution will benefit his own products. This problem
is solved in the franchising model, which allows the manufacturer to advertise own brands and
training the dispenser, knowing that the benefits of these efforts will accrue to his franchisees
and himself only.
However, as we discussed in section 4.1, the dispenser has a serious problem of credibility and
trust-worthiness: In order to signal independence from manufacturers the dispenser may want
to carry products from more than one manufacturer.45 To solv  (part of) the credibility
problem, the dispenser may want to be independent.46 But again, if the dispenser carries
products from more than one manufacturer, each manufacturer will be reluctant to invest in the
dispenser, as he cannot know whether that investment will benefit himself or his competitors.
And without such investments, no specific assets will be accumulated with the dispenser, and
the transaction cost argument for vertical integration will not apply to this case. So as long as
credibility is important, franchising is unlikely.
On top of this argument against specific investments, the hearing instrument market is highly
differentiated with very heterogeneous demand. Compare e.g. with glasses for which lenses
differ basically along a one-dimensional axis running from lenses for long-sightedness to lenses
for short-sightedness. Hearing losses are much more complex and no single instrument or
series of instruments can cover all types of hearing losses.47 More p cifically, although hearing
instrument manufacturers typically can deliver all types of hearing instruments in terms of size,
they cannot cover all types of signal processing technology and algorithms used. Again, this
requires dispensers to carry many brands and therefore precludes investments in brand-specific
48 In section 4.2, we will come back to this “power balance” to see how manufacturers deal with the
relation to dispensers.
49 It is possible, though, to find American examples also. One chain is Hear for Life. It cooperates
closely with Danavox.
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assets and an ensuing vertical integration.
In the case that a manufacturer eventually would market a product portfolio that covers all
customer needs, vertical integration might be more frequent. (We return to this possibility in
section 5.) Still, of course, the credibility problem remains unsolved in that case.
The conclusion on vertical relations thus is, that is seems unlikely that manufacturers will be
able to take control over dispensers via franchising or similar arrangements. This leaves the
manufacturers without much influence on the relations to the ultimate end-user, and therefore
with a reduced array of market influencing instruments, a situation that makes it particularly
difficult to promote new products.
Chain-stores
While the manufacturers may find it frustrating to be decoupled from the daily contact to end-
users, the dispensers might see the relationship to manufacturers in another perspective: As
mentioned in section 2, there is a limited number (max. 20) of manufacturers on a global scale.
The dispenser structure is much more fragmented: In a free-market situation as the American,
there is one dispenser for every 20-22,000 inhabitants, since there are app. 11,000 dispensers
in the US. That gives the average dispenser an annual sale of only about 150 instruments. So
there are many, small dispensers confronting a limited number of manufacturers.48 This is
potentially a bad situation for the dispensers. It definitely is difficult to negotiate lower
instrument prices for one, small dispenser.
The obvious solution to this problem of weak bargaining power is the creation of chain-stores.
Chain stores (or cooperative purchasing) would provide the volume that could be used in
bargaining with manufacturers and would moreover enable the establishment of manufacturer-
independent training. Admittedly, chains and cooperatives are emerging (most frequently in
Europe), but still the concept has not succeeded to the same degrees as in many other retail
sectors, such as glasses and contact lenses.49
There probably is no simple answer to the question of why hearing instrument retailing is so
fragmented. One reason may be the limited supply of persons with the right skills for managing
a chain of new dispenser stores. As long as fitting hearing instruments is a highly customized
process, fitting personnel must be well educated and trained. If there is no threat of new entry,
existing dispensers might not feel the need for getting together in some kind of cooperation.
Also, a new store might have a hard time gaining sufficient volume in a local market that is
50 This may be seen as a Hotelling type horizontal product-differentiation (Schmalensee, 1978).
51 In England (perhaps an extreme case), very few instruments distributed through the NHS system are
ITE or programmable instruments.
52 However, in case managed care systems include hearing instruments, the result on competition will
probably be more or less the same as in the socialized systems.
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already occupied.50 In a slow-growing market this could be a major problem, contrary to e.g.
the fast food market, where the personnel problem also is solved. And finally, dispensers may
not feel like getting together. The culture of this trade may well be hostile to any arrangement
that reduces the degrees of freedom for each dispenser.
Interestingly enough, a chain-store development might not necessarily be opposed by the
manufacturers. Even though a chain may be a tougher counter-part in negotiations, it may well
be that it is easier to introduce new products and services through a chain than through a large
number of free-standing dispensers, and chain-stores certainly will economize on contacting
and contracting costs because of fewer relations. The eventual outcome definitely is difficult to
predict, both in terms of distribution of benefits between the two levels in the value chain and
in terms of possible structural changes on the manufacturing side. It may well be that the
emergence of a few, strong chains would eliminate some of the weaker manufacturers.
A perspective on such a situation might be obtained by comparing the American system to a
government-procurement system such as the Danish: In the latter case (which is rather similar
to e.g. the British, Swedish and Australian cases), hearing instruments are distributed free to
patients through government agencies, the so-called “hearing clinics”. The Danish clinics
jointly procure instruments (some 60,000 a year) by annual tenders, with each of the large
clinics (Bispebjerg, Århus, and Ålborg) each dispensing app. 7,000 instruments annually
(Sundhedsministeriet, 1997). Such customers are very interesting for the manufacturers, both
because of the volume and because of the low sales costs (one bid suffices). The customer,
however, is also very demanding due to its technical and medical experience, and the industry
frequently laments over the clinics’ reluctance to accept the latest (and most expensive)
instruments. With limited budgets, centralized expertise and a commitment to provide
(technically) adequate solutions to as many patients as possible, it has been difficult for
manufacturers to penetrate socialized hearing care systems with high-performance instruments,
simply because the clinics do not accept the steep price for new, (maybe yet unproven)
technical features.51 Turning again to America, dispenser chains in free-market systems do not
necessarily share these features, and may therefore be better vehicles for the introduction of
new, high-performance (and expensive) hearing instruments, overcoming some of the existing
inertia on the dispenser-level.52
Summing up, we see that the dispenser level is both a necessary mediator (contacting and
counseling end-users) and an actual barrier (not loyal to the manufacturer, lacking technologi-
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cal insight) in the relation between hard-of-hearing people and hearing instrument manufactur-
ers. It furthermore appears to be a structural condition that will change only very unlikely. 
4.3 Hearing instrument manufacturers
In addition to the stabilizing factors at the end-user and dispenser levels, of course the industry
itself has certain characteristics that may influence stability. To this end, we will examine a
range of possible explanations for this observed pattern including: Characteristics of demand;
the complex character of technology; high exit costs; shared patents (patent pool); research
collaboration; shared development of fitting software; production agreements; and information
activities.
As mentioned earlier, the industry is fairly small, only app. 20 companies worldwide are really
important, and the industry produces only approximately 5 mill. hearing instruments annually.
In general, "everybody" knows each other both in the market place and personally. At industry
fairs most staff from component suppliers and hearing instrument manufacturers meet and
know each other by first name, and there is a tendency for people to stay in the industry once
they have entered it. People thus have long tenure. But, of course, the companies compete.
They bid on the same tenders put out by governments, and they appeal to the same dispensers
in the free markets.
This section will try to assess the nature of competition in this industry. Without pretending to
present an exhaustive list of competitive aspects, and with some observations only slightly
more than anecdotally substantiated, the picture that emerges seems to be one of rather limited
competitive interaction or more precisely, an industry with “cooperative islands” in the world
of competition. On this basis we will hypothetically describe the industry as a “friendly
oligopoly”. 
The list of aspects starts with industry behavior conditioned directly by factors external to the
companies in the industry, and then we turn to observations on more “proactive” or strategic
behavior.
Characteristics of demand: Pricing and advertising
As we have discussed in section 4.1, even if the potential market has not been realized, nothing
indicates that lower prices would be an effective (profitable) tool for increasing unit sales.
Aggressive pricing by the industry as a whole does not seem to be a very rewarding behavior,
in the sense that lower prices apparently cannot attract enough new customers to compensate
for lost profit per unit. However, what is more interesting for the individual manufacturer than
the market demand schedule is, of course, their individual demand curves, that is, the price
sensitivity of their individual sales. Again, it seems as if price sensitivity is rather low. No one
manufacturer seems to be able to capture large markets by lowering prices.
53 If buyers are technically well educated (as procurement agencies in countries with socialized hearing
health systems, or perhaps chain-stores or cooperatives) competition tends to be much tougher
because such buyers look primarily upon technical performance in relation to costs. Thorough and
reliable consumer reports on hearing instrument performance may move the competition in the same
direction.
54 It should be noted, of course, that this argument only applies if customers are willing to change
dispenser if prices change, a situation that, cf. our discussion above, perhaps is not frequent in this
industry.
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Essentially, this pattern may be attributed to the fact that the product is very differentiated, at
least for non-technicians. This is not to say that hearing instruments technically are very
different. In fact – within the same product type – they are more or less identical. However,
what matters is that to dispensers and laypersons (including newspaper journalists) hearing
instruments appear to be different. That goes for design and technology, the service they are
accompanied by, the image created around them, and the way they are distributed. Non-
technicians cannot compare them, and the cross-price elasticity between them therefore
remains low. It therefore has little effect for one manufacturer to lower its prices.53
Price reductions may also not be attractive in a situation where very quick reactions from
competitors are to be expected. In that case, even though extra customers may be reached,
they will quickly disappear again, as competitors also lower their prices. The outcome in such a
case will be lower prices for all, and only as many extra customers as the industry demand
function allows. This argument seems also to apply, to some degree at least, in the hearing
instrument industry. Especially the fact that dispensers frequently buy only one instrument at a
time makes it possible to match discounts very quickly.54
On the dispenser-level, manufacturers’ incentive schemes are adding considerably to low
volatility. When dispensers have a big say in which instrument the customer chooses, and the
customer is not very price sensitive (or has no alternative suppliers), the dispenser will not be
encouraged to recommend a cheap instruments. He will be tempted to offer the one with the
highest margin for himself. Still, that should not mute price-competition among manufacturers.
However, if many manufacturers have loyalty programmes, rewarding dispensers that buy
many instruments from the manufacturer, price-competition will be greatly reduced (Nalebuff
& Brandenburger, 1996). And indeed, such incentive schemes are very frequent in the hearing
instrument industry. They work much the same way as in the airline industry (Borenstein,
1992), exploiting the fact that customers have little bargaining power, and segmenting
customers into groups with a high degree of loyalty to a particular manufacturer by creating
switching costs in terms of lost loyalty bonuses.
55 Even if the dispenser directly encourages customers to look for alternatives, very few customers
actually do visit several dispensers (at least according to our knowledge). One explanation is the
limited number of dispensers in each neighborhood, another that customers trust the friends or
doctors that typically have recommended a specific dispenser, still another that it is in the first place
a major threshold to pass to admit to one person (dispenser) that help is needed, and many probably
are willing to risk paying for not repeating that (somehow humiliating) situation (cf. our discussion
of stigma).
56 An extreme version of this situation occurred when Oticon and Widex introduced their fully digital
instruments in late 1995. The wide exposure also to a Danish audience induced a number of hard-of-
hearing persons to call their local hearing clinic and ask if they could be fitted a digital instrument.
Besides the fact that at least one of the manufacturers were not ready to deliver the instruments, the
procurement process in the Danish, fully publicly financed system is not able to include new products
that quickly. New types of instruments are only included in the assortment after thorough consider-
ations over both costs and quality, and – like for private dispensers – only a limited number of brands
are carried at a given point in time.
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Figure 3: Pull marketing in hearing
instruments
If competition on price is not attractive, advertis-
ing might work. It may be useful to distinguish
between brand-oriented advertising and general
information about the benefits of hearing instru-
ments. Brand-campaigns, in turn, may be directed
both towards dispensers and end-users, while
general information about hearing instruments
should be targeted to the general public (potential
users plus their relatives, colleagues etc.) and to
some degree also family doctors.
Brand-oriented advertising is used, but not in
very large scale. One major problem in creating a
pull-effect (arrow B in figure 3) is that a market-
ing message to the end-users will have to be “fil-
tered” through the dispenser. The end-user relies
heavily on the dispenser to choose for him/her55
and will probably trust the dispenser more than a
marketing campaign. Even if potential users have formed preferences for a specific brand, it is
not certain that the dispenser will agree that that particular brand is actually the best choice,
and – even worse – the dispenser might not even carry that brand.56 Here, the difficulty for a
manufacturer with a novel product is that of a distribution level that is slow-reacting (sticky)
due to the factors discussed above (professional self-esteem, incentive schemes etc.). 
Another problem is that most people seldom buy more than a couple of different instruments in
their lifetime (hearing problems are strongly age-related), and therefore do not pay much
attention to the type of instrument before having to buy one. When advertising hardly creates
brand-loyalty but rather awareness of hearing instruments in general, much of the benefit of an
57 These arguments may explain why the so-called project Pygmalion (Starkey, 1997) found that
advertising generally is not effective for hearing instruments.
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advertising campaign will accrue to competitors (spill-over effects), making advertising
unprofitable for the individual company. The problem generally increases with industry
fragmentation, that is, the smaller the companies are relatively, the smaller is the payoff that
accrue to them compared to total industry payoffs. So even one of the three largest companies
can only expect to reap one fifth (their market share) of the benefits of a general public
marketing campaign (see also our treatment of “information activities below).57 In section 4.4,
we will see how this condition affects also suppliers.
The limited marketing efforts towards end-users may contribute to industry stability by
reducing both entrants’ and incumbents’ possibilities for informing the public about new
products. A number of studies of the cigarette industry showed higher profit and fewer entries
when TV advertising was banned (see e.g. Eckard, 1991). If mass-marketing is not possible –
for the reasons discussed above – the information channel between manufacturers and end-
customers is shot off. Information about new products or other changes in the offers to
customers must in that case get channeled through dispensers, probably retarding the impact,
and underscoring manufacturers’ dependence on dispensers. We will discuss possible changes
in advertising behavior in section 5.
Thus, most marketing efforts by manufacturers are directed at dispensers. Such efforts come in
the range from technical education to free cruises (sometimes combined). A major element in
manufacturers’ dealing with dispensers is incentive schemes and loyalty-bonuses which ties-in
dispensers to particular manufacturers, thereby increasing the stickiness of the dispensers.
Much of the marketing effort towards dispensers is thus “defensive” with the aim of building
switching costs, in order to reassure that one’s dispensers do not change to other manufactur-
ers. Advertising towards dispensers probably cannot widen the total market, and it may move
market shares only very slowly. These attempts at cementing status quo presumably have a
direct stabilizing influence on structure, while they probably have no effect on total end-user
demand. 
 
When marketing messages to end-users get filtered through the dispensers, modifying or even
nullifying manufacturer’s claims, it is reasonable that pull-marketing is not widely used, and
when furthermore conservative dispensers are tied-in to specific manufacturers, the possibilities
for both existing and new companies in the field to gain market shares are certainly reduced,
thereby stabilizing the industry.
The character of technology
Hearing instruments, no matter size or type of signal processing, are made up of roughly the
same elements: A microphone, an amplifier, and a receiver (loudspeaker) is the technical core,
powered by a battery. Adjustments may be made by switches and trimmers (small plastic items)
58 This is the main reason why we only now witness the introduction of digital sound processing in
hearing instruments, a technology that has been available in standard Hi-Fi equipment for decades.
59 Conversation with Torben Poulsen, Department of Acoustic Technology, Technical University of
Denmark, November 1997.
60 We are here dealing with the difference between “functional” uncertainty and “technical” uncertainty
in development processes (see Freeman, 1982; Lotz, 1991). While technical uncertainty relates to
problems of reaching a well specified technical objective, functional uncertainty refers to the
problems of choosing the optimal technical specification, that is, the best design of the product.
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or, in the so-called programmables, by a programmed chip. The digital instruments have digital
amplifiers plus additionally an A/D and a D/A converter to change the analog sound received
to digital signals processed in the amplifier and back to analog sound to be send to the ear.
Even though a hearing aid therefore, supe ficially, is a standard electronic device with well-
known components and should be able to benefit from the now “generic” technologies of
electronics, the improvement of hearing instruments has not been a trivial process. It turns out
that it has in fact no been possible simply to transfer technologies from other electronics fields.
The tough limits on space have created development problems unique to the hearing instru-
ment industry. 
Obviously, the space limits influence the choice of power source. Only very few electronic
components are designed for 1.4 voltage. Currently that has required the development of not
only specialty circuitry capable of running on low voltage, but also the necessary development
tools (e.g. mathematical simulations).58 Besides the electronics, the small size also posed
mechanical and acoustical problems. Most notable is the (still partly unsolved) problem of
feedback from the receiver to the microphone.59 As we will discuss below, the severe space
limits have decisive consequences for the nature of technological development because of
strong interdependencies among components.
Beyond the pure technological problems, hearing instrument development is hampered by the
uncertainty in development objectives60 stemming from the fundamental problem that hearing is
a complicated physiological phenomenon, which is not thoroughly understood.
One of the reasons for the problems of understanding hearing is that – in contrast to glasses,
which can fully compensate for a reduced ability to see – hearing instruments send amplified
sound into a genuinely defect organ. Eyes may be defect also, but usually the lenses are just
not “focused”. A hearing instrument cannot repair a hearing impairment, but can to some
extent alleviate dysfunctional hearing. However, the auditory system which a hearing instru-
ment is targeted at is still not fully understood, and it requires a multiplicity of disciplines (e.g.
physics, anatomy, psychology, chemistry, neurology) to advance knowledge in this field. This
implies that in order to understand and alleviate hearing impairment, a number of professions
need to become involved.
61 Conversation with Torben Poulsen, Department of Acoustic Technology, Technical University of
Denmark, November 1997.
62 Rosenberg (1982) describes the development of aircrafts, which took place also without a formal
model of the performance of airplanes. Instead, according to Rosenberg, the development process
relied on learning-by-using (trial-and-error processes being inappropriate for airplanes!).
63 Compare here to e.g. wind turbines: The overwhelming interest of a wind turbine manufacturer is to
produce a turbine with a high energy production per investment cost (for the buyer of the turbine).
This is a much more well-defined development (one-dimensional) task than in hearing instruments,
which are more alike automobile in this aspect. In fact, Lyregaard (1993, pp. 40-41) lists eight
performance criteria for a hearing instrument. To develop a better hearing instrument, the manufac-
turer must strike a balance between all eight performance dimensions.
64 It is, thus, possible to identify slightly diverging strategies for the manufacturers: For instance,
Phonak emphasizes the directional hearing instrument, and Widex and Oticon seek improved signal
processing and amplification by going digital.
65 This strategy makes sense even more since patent protection generally is not efficient for hearing
instruments. A complex system (a car or an electronic instrument) is seldom patentable, but parts
(components) may very well be. This is the case for this industry also.
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A first consequence of this situation is that it is still not clear which technical solution is
actually best for the users. The situation in hearing instrument technology is one of relatively
rich technological opportunities, but only vaguely identified development targets.61 The basic
understanding of hearing does not point at any clear ways of how to substantially improve the
performance of a hearing instrument. 
Since we still do not know all about what hearing is and therefore not all about what the
different kinds of hearing losses are, the industry is left searching for the optimal hearing
instrument. Much development in hearing instrument is therefore a trial-and-error process,
since no formal model can prescribe the optimal construction of a hearing instrument.62 Not
only is trial-and-error important for finding the best technical solution to a given development
task, but trial-and-error is necessary also to find out which development tasks to strive for, that
is, which type of instrument (features, size etc.) actually meets the users’ best.63 This allows a
certain degree of “design competition” which spells itself out in the discussions over whether
e.g. digitalization or directional instruments is the best path to pursue.64
A second consequence of this ambiguity is a reluctance to risk too much on far-reaching R&D
projects. As chances of coming up with thesolution are very small, it does not make sense for
individual companies to invest heavily in one out of many possible development projects. It
makes more sense to make minor steps, watch what competitors are doing, correct ones own
direction according to what seems to be successful, and then take another small step.65 This
seems to a large degree to be the case in the hearing instrument industry. Generally, only when
there is a consensus about where to go (and tools are available), development moves fast.
But if there is no such shared understanding regarding the development tasks for hearing
66 Lyregaard (1993) is a nice illustration of the bewilderment among industry participants on which
way to go.
67 This is in a funny way a self-fulfilling prophecy: So concerned about the stigma problem, the
industry has interpreted the visibility of a hearing instrument as the major cause of stigma. If only
other people could not tell who are wearing hearing instruments, there would be no stigma problems.
Therefore, a major feature of most brochures for hearing instruments is an emphasis on the product’s
“tinyness” or invisibility. Thus, even if the customers did not share this view before, as soon as they
visit a dispenser they are lured into the understanding that hearing instruments should not be visible,
thereby underscoring the stigma problem.
68 The concept of “systemic” technology has been gaining interest during the 1980s. Rosenberg (1982)
emphasized the complementarity between the individual elements of systemic innovations, Winter
(1987) mentions the dichotomy between independent and systemic in an attempt to identify
dimensions of knowledge, and finally Teece (1988) introduces systemicness in technology as a factor
conducive for vertical integration, a perspective further elaborated on also by Langlois & Robertson
(1995). A systems approach on nations is the emerging research field of “national systems of
innovation” (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993) 
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instruments in general,66 it certainly is the case for a specific aspect of the well-known ITE and
BTE designs: The size of the instruments. There is apparently unanimously support for the
position that “the smaller the instrument, the better”.67 This cr ates a focus on a specific part of
the development task, namely the reduction of size, or in short miniaturization. While research
in the overall question of what is a “good” hearing instrument is still best described as a trial-
and error process, miniaturization follows a different logic. Guiding this research and develop-
ment is a technological trajectory (Dosi, 1982), mental guidelines shared by all members in the
industry that focus attention on a limited number of problems and solutions. Size reduction has
been an overarching development pursuit, assuming that customers always prefer a smaller
instrument to a bigger, also even if quality is not the best. And certainly, the industry has been
remarkably successful in making small instruments.
Returning to the technological problems of hearing instrument development, it is important to
underline another consequence of limited space. Even though the number of components in a
hearing instrument is limited, the interaction between these components is highly complicated
because of the limited space available. Each component needs to be adapted to each and
everyone of the other components, not only to optimize the total system of a set of specific
components in general, but also to optimize a system of these components in a spatially
specific combination, that is, in a specific layout in a specific case.
 
The systemic68 haracter, the very high degree of interdependency of elements, is therefore
pervasive in hearing instrument technology. Integration of technologies (whether components,
production techniques or audiological principles) is extremely important. No new technology is
of much value p r se – only after integration with other technologies may it be useful.
This feature makes rapid movements difficult. Even if one part of a hearing instrument may be
dramatically improved, that part still needs to be integrated into the system, and that process
69 We are perfectly aware, that this is a somewhat subjective assessment that others may not share. The
clue is to agree on what to consider a major improvement. We tend to take the perspective of the
user.
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may take some time as both manufacturer and component suppliers need time and resources to
adjust the other parts. All elements must move together, co-evolve, making technological
development smoother. This is a stabilizing factor in the sense that “jumps” based on even
radical technological improvements along a single dimension of the complex hearing instru-
ment technology are unlikely. 
The result of these characteristics of technology of the product, is a development that has had
miniaturization as its main component, added numerous improvements on partial problems,
such as the feedback problem, or – with the programmable and digital instruments – automatic
adjustments to the sound picture. Notwithstanding the efforts and the introduction of new
technologies, the overall performance of the hearing instrument has been largely unchanged
over the past 25 years.69 It is easy to be carried away by the very technical language applied in
promotional material for new instruments, and mistake the appraisals of the new generations of
products for major improvements. Indeed, hearing instruments have become smaller and
technically refined, but – for the user – no major breakthroughs have seemingly taken place.
Both the lack of sufficient formal knowledge about hearing (making it unclear in which
direction to go) and the systemic character of the instrument (making quick moves difficult)
are stabilizing factors, impeding individual hearing instrument firms in developing radically new
products.
So the impact of technology on industry structure is to favor incumbents and even to make
shifts in market shares difficult. The systemic nature of the technology requires a broad
“architectural” knowledge-base (see section 3), and such knowledge is not available on any
market. The only way to obtain it is to participate in the industry, learning from one’s own
trial-and-error developments and hopefully also becoming able to decipher competitors’
experiences. While in other industries entrants with new product innovations may cause
disruption, in this industry the ability to produce product innovations is so closely linked to the
learning that takes place by being in the industry that entry on the basis of new products seems
unlikely.
High exit costs
We have mentioned (see table 1) the fact that only very few hearing industry companies are
public (Oticon, Phonak, ReSound). A handful of companies are owned by larger corporations
(Siemens, Dahlberg/Miracle Ear, Danavox, Philips). The remainder companies are typically
privately owned, many of them with the founding family still involved in management, and with
no other activities than hearing instrument production.
It is useful to analyze the differences in performance requirements and exit costs for the
70 These are not patents on entire instruments, but on certain principles for digital signal processing.
71 Industry sources claim that the 3M patent portfolio included claims on obvious and well-known
principles (Rude & Eriksen, 1997).
72 This presumably refers to the 3M portfolio.
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different ownership structure of companies. Roughly speaking, a publicly held company must
meet certain performance criteria to avoid major restructuring or acquisitions. A subsidiary of
a large company may run at low performance for a period, but eventually it is sold or just
closed down. Family companies, though, do not entirely follow such logic. A family owned
company may well run for a very long time with almost no profits, the reason being lack of
alternatives for management-owners: Exit costs are high. Such companies may choose to price
almost at marginal costs just to stay in business.
No financial data are available, but it might very well be the case that some family owned
companies are actually not profitable. If this is the case, industry structure (market shares) may
for a while remain unchanged, making the industry seem stable. This might, however, conceal a
spread in profitability that cannot leave the industry unaffected for ever. We return to this
possibility in section 5.
Patent pool
In recent years 3M has built a considerable portfolio of patents on signal processing technol-
ogy related to programmable and digital hearing instruments.70 The number of patents (170
individual patents belonging to 25-26 “patent families” (Rude & Eriksen, 1997)) and especially
the very broad and generic character71 of th  patents has threatened to block the development
of new programmable and digital hearing instruments for the rest of the industry. Apparently,
many hearing instrument companies were close to or actually did violate these patents, and in
1993 3M eventually sued ReSound for patent infringements. (ReSound, 1996b; Rude &
Eriksen, 1997).
As a solution to the patent litigation, ReSound in the Spring of 1996 announced that it was
about to take over “certain assets” of 3M’s hearing health activities, including research
facilities and patents and patent applications. The acquisition was completed in July (ReSound,
1996a; b). In August 1996, ReSound transferred the ownership of the 3M patents to a “Patent
Partnership”, called HIMPP (Hearing Instrument Manufacturers Patent Partnership) (Re-
Sound, 1996c). This patent pool was set up by ReSound plus five other leading hearing
instrument manufacturers (Danavox, Oticon, Phonak, Starkey, and Widex), with Siemens
added soon after, and is chaired by Widex (HIMPP, 1996; HIMPP, 1997).
The purpose of HIMPP is limited to “acquire a large patent portfolio72 and make it available to
all interested parties in the hearing aid industry through membership in the partnership or
through licence” (HIMPP, 1997). No more patents than the 3M patents have apparently been
73 If the value of a patent for a hearing instrument manufacturer is proportional to the manufacturer’s
current volume, the pool will have to pay only marginally more than the biggest non-pool-member
would offer, a figure that goes towards zero as the pool includes more and more manufacturers.
74 While this is not an antitrust analysis, it is clear that the two first effects are welfare-increasing, by
diffusing existing knowledge as widely as possible and by eliminating unnecessary, duplicate
research. The third effect may well be welfare-reducing as it may reduce incentives for innovative
activities related to hearing instruments, while the fourth effect may increase welfare by allowing
research that no one company would undertake alone. Of course, these consideration are conditioned
on no other effects on competition by the pool.
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added, but the possibility of expanding the portfolio is not excluded by the pool. It seems to be
the intention that this patent pool shall buy “generic” patents that otherwise would block the
development of new hearing instruments. “Strategic” patents that protect a particular instru-
ment will not be pooled, but remain proprietary to the company which took out the patent.
The economics of patent pool arrangements are relatively complicated (see Andewelt, 1984)
and not well explored. From an anti-trust perspective, four factors may have caused the
industry to set up the collaboration: Firstly, the more important probably being an attempt to
economize on contracting costs. It certainly is very costly to set up licensing agreements. The
HIMPP solution limits the contracting costs to the initial formation of HIMPP, indeed a very
simple and cost-efficient arrangement, granting all members all rights to use all 3M patents
without any further negotiations or monitoring. Secondly, the pooling agreement eliminates the
incentives to develop competing patents, economizing on R&D expenditures. And, thirdly, the
industry probably also has considered the increased bargaining power of joining forces vis-à-
vis the owner of a patent with possible applications in the hearing instrument industry. The
patent pool in this situation turns into a purchasing agreement, similar to agreements among
retailers (supermarkets, opticians, bookstores etc.) or hospitals to set up purchasing agree-
ments and thereby act as one agent (a monopsonist) towards suppliers. With all the major
companies in the pool, negotiation power vis-à-vis independent innovators seems to be
considerable.73 Finally, the partnership may engage in research activities that can produce new,
generic patents. The 3M patent portfolio was established largely through a 3M collaboration
with Washington University, an arrangement that could be repeated (Rude & Eriksen, 1997).74
If there in general are benefits (for participants) from establishing an industry patent pool, it
might be worthwhile to question why it is such a rare phenomenon. Following the text-book
(e.g. Scherer & Ross, 1990) requirements for cartel behavior, it may be argued as if the
establishment of a patent pool requires elements as cultural and cognitive proximity between
members in order to work. The establishment of the HIMPP patent pool may be an indication
of the existence of such conditions in the hearing instrument industry, and thereby HIMPP
contributes to the understanding of the “competitive climate” in the hearing instrument
industry: Eliminating a potential, competitive advantage (ReSound could have kept the 3M
patents proprietary) probably requires a relatively sophisticated common understanding of who
is to win and who is to loose on this arrangement, and therefore on some kind of a compensa-
75 That is, concerning research topics of such a basic nature that it needs additional, applied research in
order to be useful for industry. The term has been widely use in EU research programs.
76 Interview with the former project manager of ODIN, Torben Poulsen, Technical University of
Denmark, Fall 1996.
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tion schedule (be it very simple). The same goes for possible future research project to which
the pool-members must contribute according to some scheme. The establishment of such a
scheme probably in most other circumstances requires so detailed and confidential information
that an agreement will never be met, but in the case of the hearing instrument industry the
long-lasting relationship and mutual understanding apparently enabled it.
By setting up the pool and agreeing on a compensation schedule on the basis of today’s
benefits for the participants, the agreement reduces the “risk” that one of the participants will
benefit alone either by buying the patents (e.g. ReSound) at a price lower than their eventual
value (similar to winning in a lottery) or by developing a patent that replaces the existing
patents and thereby destroys their economic value. The pooling arrangement therefore
contributes to “locking” the companies into the existing structure of relative size.
Research collaboration
Improved quality has great competitive potentials, especially since better hearing instruments
may increase the fraction of hard-of-hearing persons that actually uses hearing instruments. But
the market is usually very skeptical and slow moving, a characteristic that probably has been
strengthened after the FDA intervention in the mid-1990s vis-à vis Miracle Ear. However,
improved quality has been a major concern of the manufacturers, and besides individual efforts
to develop better instruments, there has been a least one major collaborative research effort.
Starting in 1989, the three Danish companies (Oticon, Widex and Danavox) participated in the
research project ODIN, located at and managed by the Danish Technical University. Each of
the companies contributed with manpower and the Danish government supplied basic financial
support. The nature of the research was truly “pre-competitive”75 ai ing at enhancing the
understanding of speech comprehension with background noise, one of many still unexplored
areas of basic research within audiology, but the results have later been applied to the develop-
ment of programmable and especially the fully digital hearing instruments.76
It certainly is remarkable that competitors agree in setting up joint research projects, in itself a
sign of some degree of mutual understanding and recognition. However, the results of a joint
research effort are as interesting. Besides sharing research costs and thereby producing results
that smaller scale, individual projects may not have been able to generate, a joint project also
has the effect of building common understanding of what are relevant problems and ways to
solve them. It tunes the participating companies into a specific way of interpreting the
problems facing them and coordinates (to some degree) the means for solving them, reinforc-
77 Interestingly, this should reduce the amount of specific investments and decrease switching costs for
dispensers, allowing them to change supplier more easily. However, still only 57% of American
dispensers use computers for testing and fitting (Skafte, 1997). 
78 See, however, section 3 for the latest developments in the fitting field.
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ing the established technological trajectory. Joint projects – on the one hand – prevent that
some companies simply do not realize certain technical problems and possible solutions,
thereby getting lost. On the other hand they make it more difficult for single companies to
move rapidly alone along some technological dimension, trying to reap first-mover-advantages
(and risking to make the wrong bets). Thus, joint projects may contribute to industry members
keeping in step instead of each pursuing their own idiosyncratic ideas, thereby limiting
variation.
Shared development of fitting software
While participation in the ODIN project was limited to only the Danish companies, most
hearing health companies are now members of the Hearing Instrument Manufacturers'
Software Association (HIMSA). HIMSA was founded by and is still owned by the three
Danish companies plus Swiss Phonak, but soon most other companies supported the effort.
Incorporated in Denmark in 1993, the aim of this collaborative effort was to develop a
standardized fitting software to dispensers in order to promote the diffusion of programmable
instruments.
Realizing that the penetration of programmable instruments was slowed down by the inability
of dispensers to deal with the growing range of different fitting tools provided by the manufac-
turers, HIMSA decided to develop a PC based fitting software (called NOAH) that could
accommodate all types of programmable instruments. Instead of producing model-specific
transformers (boxes), the PC based system requires only that the manufacturer supplies the
dispenser with a piece of software (and that the dispenser has a PC).77
The HIMSA cooperation has set an industry standard that obviously has muted a competitive
dimension, namely the hardware boxes. Destabilizing effects from that area have thereby been
avoided.78
Production agreements
Frost & Sullivan (1994) mention that some companies only produce some instrument sizes and
source the remaining sizes by other hearing instrument companies. It certainly seems to be an
attractive strategy e.g. for an American company producing ITE and ITC products to source
BTE products with one of the European companies, if its sales of BTE products on the
American market is too limited to warrant production.
The attractiveness of such agreements of course depends heavily on the degree of economies
79 Siemens’ ambitious expansion of production capacity in Singapore and Suzhou, China, (see
Siemens’ home-page) may be part of a plan for the extension of shared production. If capacity
exceeds demand, however, excess capacity may trigger price wars (see section 3).
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of scale and scope in production. Even though companies differ in terms of product range, this
should not lead to the conclusion that mobility between the product segments is particularly
difficult. Every manufacturer seems to be able to produce both BTE, and ITE and ITC
products, and from the companys’ product portfolios it seems more to be the case that the
product preferences of served markets govern the product portfolio more than the other way
around. That is, technological competencies of companies determining their choice of
products. So even though a company may be capable of producing the full range of products,
it may choose to manufacture only its most frequently sold types.
The ability to produce every type of hearing instrument might be exploited both by not
producing and by actually producing: If economies of scale are substantial, it may well be more
economical to use the ability to produce internally only to negotiate reasonable prices with
another hearing instrument manufacturer, sourcing particular products to complete one’s
product range.
The extent of such activities is basically unknown to us,79 but it probably can take place only
under circumstances characterized by mutual trust and respect. It may indeed work best if the
relationship is reciprocal, that is, one company producing BTE instruments for another
company that in turn produces ITE/ITC instruments for the first company. In that case, hearing
instrument manufacturers exploit each other’s production competencies, tie each other in, and
gain important information on each other, all factors furthering stability.
Information activities
If stigma is a major obstacle for the penetration of the potential market, there seems to be
scope for a massive campaign towards the general public, educating it about the benefits of
wearing hearing instruments. As a result of such discussions the American hearing instrument
manufacturers, dispensers, and suppliers in 1973 initiated the formation of the Better Hearing
Institute (BHI) as a vehicle for the dissemination of information about hearing health and
hearing instruments.
Usually such collaborations are difficult for industries to establish, but in this case it succeeded.
Support for BHI has not, however, been stable, and recent marketing research (Starkey, 1997)
indicates that even if stigma is a problem, marketing efforts can do very little to alleviate the
problem. The dwindling support for BHI may therefore be taken not so much as a sign of
negotiation problems, but more as a realization that such efforts may not be worthwhile; that
the customers do have the relevant information already, that they make reasonably rational
choices (that they actually would not benefit enough from a hearing instrument to warrant the
expenditure), and that no more information can persuade them to buy more hearing instru-
80 We return to this observation in section 4.
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ments.
Conclusion
Summing up on the industry behavior it should be stressed that the industry is in a situation
where tough competition on price and advertising makes only limited economical sense, not
only from an industry perspective but also for the individual companies. Also to some degree
muting competition is technology, as it does not allow for major jumps. Finally, and probably
partly an effect of the former characteristics, the industry participants have succeeded in
building a series of collaborative undertakings, all of them adding to the mutual trust and
respect among industry participants, which again facilitates further collaboration. Competition
of course is still vigorous, we are certainly not dealing with anything like a cartel, but at least in
some areas, along certain competitive dimensions, competition is supplemented with coopera-
tion.80 It is on this basis that we have coined the term “friendly oligopoly” on the hearing
instrument industry.
4.4 Suppliers
Component suppliers deliver components to the hearing instrument manufacturer which
assembles them with own parts. The degree of backwards vertical integration is limited,
however, so the only component types which some hearing instrument manufacturers produce
partly themselves are some electro-mechanical components and amplifiers.
As we have stressed in section 4.3 discussing the systemic character of the technology, each
component interacts with all other components in the small space available in the shell of a
hearing instrument. A component supplier, thus, cannot change a parameter of its component
without influencing the functioning of the entire hearing instrument, all else equal. Once a
component has been designed into a specific hearing instrument model, it typically will not be
substituted by another supplier’s components, neither a cheaper one (since even the so-called
“drop-in” copies are never exactly the same as the original components) nor a better one (since
one better component can rarely improve the performance of a whole instrument), thus
establishing switching costs.
The manufacturer is the assembler of diverse components, and is therefore the coordinator of
disparate suppliers and their components. Each supplier provides no more than one, small part
of a larger whole, characterized by strong technological interdependencies. Therefore, if a
supplier develops a new component with a changed functionality, such a component may be
difficult to commercialize, since acceptance from several parties of the customer base is
required. Acceptance has to be built with designers at hearing instrument manufacturers, who
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have to reach acceptance with their production colleagues, and so on. 
The fundamental reason for slow acceptance is the huge switching costs for hearing instrument
manufacturers, incurred from changing supplier. These costs stem from required changes in
testing, documentation, design, production processing, and purchasing. The industry, thus,
estimates that the time it takes to switch from one electro-mechanical component to another is
about two years. The reason is primarily that changes in the design are needed, and tooling has
to be reworked or adjusted. Switching costs for transducers are 4-5 months and are primarily
related to readjustment of the electro-acoustical parameters and purchasing routines (specifi-
cally part numbers). 
Thus, the development of a new and superior component will not immediately, but only very
gradually, be able to generate extra profits. This is, however, only one of two possible ways of
getting success as a component supplier. Instead of seeking acceptance from many manufac-
turers, a supplier might bet on only one manufacturer, supplying that particular one with a
custom-designed component. As development budgets are limited (so customized development
cannot be carried out for all manufacturers), economies of scale in production for some
components considerable (making a customized component more expensive than a standard
component), and as the success of a new hearing instrument depends on much more than just
one component, such a strategy is definitely very risky. All of this implies that competitive
positions change only incrementally among component suppliers.
Now, if it is cumbersome to introduce components with new functionalities because of the
suppliers’ reliance on acceptance from manufacturers, this strategy obviously is not very
attractive for suppliers. Instead, supplier development activities have focused on maintaining
the same functionality in a component, but trying to make it still smaller and smaller. In short,
“make the same but smaller”, complying with and buttressing the miniatuization trajectory of
the industry. As long as a component’s performance is well-known, acceptance of a smaller
version is almost guaranteed. This logic has driven component suppliers to develop still smaller
and smaller components.
The competitive relations between key suppliers is illustrated in table 4. Each hearing instru-
ment manufacturer tries to keep several suppliers for the same type of components in order to
decrease the suppliers’ bargaining power. However, the number of alternatives is limited, as is
shown in table 3.
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Table 4
Suppliers’ product-markets
Knowles Microtronic RTI Gennum In-house
production1
Transducers2 / / none
Electro-mechanical compo-
nents
(/)3 / / little
Amplifiers / / some
Notes:
1 Hearing instrument manufacturers’ in-house production.
2 There are two other transducer suppliers which are expected to take up 3-5% of the market for
transducers for hearing instruments: Lectret (CH/SIN) delivers microphones only, whereas Tibbetts
(USA) deliver both microphones and receivers. Due to their small size, these suppliers have been left
out of the table.
3 The parentheses by Knowles’ position in electro-mechanical components is due to Knowles’ recent
acquisition of Ruf (mid 1996), establishing Deltek as their electro-mechanical division. However, this
supplier is relatively small with an estimated share of 3% and this position has not been considerably
developed, yet.
Electro-mechanical components (trimmers, switches, volume controls) are not strategically
important to hearing instrument manufacturers. Their functions do not significantly affect the
performance of a hearing instrument. Microtronic (DK) and RTI (US) have been dominant
suppliers on the market for electro-mechanical components for about 20 years. However, they
pursue different strategies. While RTI has focused on automation of production processes,
Microtronic has centered its development around customized products. As mentioned, some
hearing instrument manufacturers produce minor amounts of electro-mechanical components
for their own use.
In this particular market, no major changes in neither technology nor structure have taken
place. Due to digitalization of hearing instruments (see section 5), electro-mechanical compo-
nents will gradually become superfluous over the coming years, and production will fade out.
We will therefore not deal further with the component market.
Amplifiers are increasingly becoming strategic components for hearing instruments manufac-
turers. Gennum (CAN) is the largest player in this product-market, but RTI’s position is
improving. More significantly, however, is that the hearing instrument manufacturers are
themselves increasingly designing and producing (parts of) their own amplifiers.
The amplifiers are the "heart" of the hearing instrument as this is where the signal processing
takes place, enabled by the specific algorithms designed into the amplifier. The algorithms are
uniformly designed by the hearing instruments manufacturers.
In terms of hardware, an amplifier consists of one or more integrated circuits (ICs) which are
mounted on a hybrid together with passive components. Some hearing instrument manufactur-
ers design their own ICs, but they do not produce them. Gennum and RTI are the main
81 In field, also HEI (US) and Etymotic Research (US) are players.
82 The Danish hearing instrument manufacturer, Danavox, produced transducers in-house at some
point in time. It is well-known in the industry that Knowles bought the production equipment and
destroyed it.
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designers of ICs for hearing instruments.81 But he final production of IC is carried out by so-
called foundries (except that Gennum manufactures some analog ICs).
A majority of the hearing instrument producers design and produce their own hybrids.
However, Gennum and RTI are also suppliers of hybrids.
Speculations on the implications for this component market of the advent of digital signal
processing will be presented in section 5.
Transducers (microphones, receivers) are regarded as highly strategic components in terms of
hearing instrument functionality and performance. Established in 1946, the American, family-
owned Knowles has ever since been the de-facto standard setting player in the transducer
product-market. This situation is, however, slowly changing as other companies recently have
been first with new products (Tibbett with a small microphone and Microtronic with a small
receiver). Knowles is now seen to make equivalents of these products. Roughly, Knowles
accounts for 80% of the market for transducers and Microtronic takes up about 15%. With
this market share, volume production at Knowles has been possible, a crucial requirement for
cost-effectiveness in the production of a generic product such as transducers. Customization
has not been prevalent on the part of Knowles vis-à-vis manufacturers, and Knowles has
moved far down the learning curve of transducer development and production.82
A further factor buttressing the position of Knowles is the strong appropriability regime
prevailing within transducers (as opposed to the hearing instrument as such). Patents are used
to a very high degree because the parameters of transducers can be explicitly specified.
Knowles has an impressive and highly effective patent profile. This essentially emphasizes
Knowles' (somewhat) monopolistic situation on the market for transducers. Its closest
competitor, formerly Microtel now Microtronic, has historically positioned itself in the market
for transducers by engineering "around" these patents to deliver so-called “drop-in” replace-
ments of Knowles' products, as this was seen as the most sound way of getting a foot-hold in
the market for transducers. Microtronic is now attempting to change this follower-strategy and
has successfully launched its first, non-Knowles-alike product.
Finally, Knowles has been active in affecting dispensers, trying to establish a market-pull effect
(arrow A in figure 3, section 4.3). A particular case in point is the so-called "Class-D", which
is the integration of a particular type of amplifier within the case of a receiver, a concept
patented by Knowles. When launching this component, Knowles actively marketed the
83 Knowles’ (and Gennum’s) position in the hearing instrument industry may be compared to the
position of Intel and Microsoft in the PC industry. In the PC-industry, the lion’s share of profits end
up with the two major suppliers, Microsoft and Intel, while the producers of PCs – to be compared
with the hearing instrument producers – earn only a modest part of total profits. See Borrus &
Zysman (1996) for an analysis of the PC industry with this perspective.
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component to dispensers, arguing for improved sound quality and smaller size of the hearing
instrument, to have them "pull" the component through the hearing instrument manufacturers.
This proved highly successful, and the Class D-concept is now a de-fact standard.
In this regard, Knowles’ strategy has been unique for a supplier in the hearing instrument
industry. Neither before nor after the Class D has such a marketing strategy been seen. The
hearing instrument manufacturers did not approve of it, but the Class D has successfully
penetrated the hearing instruments, and the manufacturers reluctantly had to accept it.
Knowles is also in other ways involved in both end-user and dispenser-level areas of concern.
As mentioned earlier, the most influential market researcher in the hearing instrument industry
is employed by Knowles (Sergei Kochkin), and Knowles is engaged (with Gennum and
Northwestern University) in investigating the effectiveness of various types of marketing mixes
(Starkey, 1997). These practices can thus be seen to cement Knowles’ transducer- position
throughout the entire value chain of the industry.
A decisive factor for Knowles engaging in these kinds of activities is its dominating position on
its own market. Unlike a hearing instrument manufacturer that cannot avoid that benefits from
advertising or general public information get captured by competitors, Knowles has historically
been alone in its specific field of transducers, and could enjoy almost all benefits in the
transducer market of e.g. an increase in total hearing instrument sales.
Knowles is thus in a virtuous circle, continuously cementing its own position and making entry
or development of alternative suppliers’ position extremely difficult. Although it is virtuous for
Knowles, it might be frustrating for hearing instrument manufacturers as they are not accom-
modated in their requests for special components and as Knowles’ bargaining power is
maintained at a high level.83
Some attempts have been tried to change this situation. Siemens Audiologische Technik
purchased the Dutch transducer supplier Microtel in 1989. As mentioned, Microtel developed
and produced “drop-in” replacements of Knowles’ products in order to reduce switching costs
for hearing instrument manufacturers. However, in transducer production economies of scale
are pervasive, and high volumes are necessary for profitable operations. In-house demand from
Siemens itself could not establish sufficient volume in Microtel, and Siemens’ competitors were
reluctant to purchase transducers from Microtel due to confidentiality and lock-in concerns
vis-à-vis Siemens.
84 Knowles’ acquisition of Ruf in 1996 may be interpreted as a retaliation: With that move, Knowles
entered Microtronic’s core business of electro-mechanical components.
85 Of course, if the manufacturers have any leverage at all, they should assess carefully the trade-off
between being exploited by a monopolist with major cost advantages due to scale economies, and
buying from two competing companies, each of them with no chance of matching a monopolist’s
scale economies. The choice hinges on the degree of scale economies and the degree of competition
between two possible suppliers.
86 This is a classic example of a Prisoners’ Dilemma.
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Therefore, in 1993 an exclusive sales agreement allowed Microtronic to sell its own electro-
mechanical components and Microtel’s transducers at the same time. And in 1995, Microtronic
acquired Microtel. Since then, Microtronic has developed as a small alternative supplier to
Knowles, and has increased its market share to approximately 15%.84 
In general, the lack of vertical integration between transducer suppliers and manufacturers can
be explained by the scale economies in development and production of the component. No
single hearing instrument manufacturer can live up to volume requirements for minimum
efficient scale (MES) of production. And as the competencies needed for transducer produc-
tion are so different from hearing instrument production, economies of scope in R&D and
production are virtually non-existing.
Therefore, the vertical integration of Siemens could not break Knowles’ monopoly, and it
remains to be seen whether the uprising of Microtronic will serve as a significant challenge for
this. In this respect, the behavior of the hearing instruments manufacturers could be of
significant importance. If manufacturers actually feel exploited by Knowles,85 they i  principle
could just shift to Microtronic (if not immediately, then gradually) and establish a balance of
power between the two suppliers. However, as long as Knowles still has a cost and product-
breath advantage compared to Microtronic, such a move is initially costly for each manufac-
turer. So while concerted action would be to the benefit of all manufacturers, each of them
would rather let the others pay the price and keep buying from Knowles.86 And despit  of the
friendly oligopoly in the hearing instrument industry and manufacturers’ successful cooperation
in other fields, there seems to be no successful coordination of support for the alternative
supplier.
In conclusion, we take the combination of the systemic character of the technology, switching
costs, and the very concentrated oligopolistic structure among suppliers as contributing to
stability in the market for hearing instruments. 
The very limited number of component suppliers may well limit possibilities for turbulence
among hearing instrument manufacturers simply because all manufacturers will have to use the
same suppliers and basically the same, generic components. The manufacturers may not like
this situation: In order to be able to distinguish themselves from the other manufacturers, each
87 We here see an example of the limits of the argument (e.g. Figueiredo & Teece, 1996) for vertical
integration because of systemic technology. If economies of scale are sufficiently strong in some
elements of the product, and the industry using these components is sufficiently fragmented, vertical
integration of these elements may be impossible. 
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manufacturer seeks to introduce new products with superior and distinctive features. But to
make a really different new hearing instruments that cannot be imitated immediately, the
manufacturer would need customized components. However, as long as component suppliers
are not forced by tough competitors into this business of customizing, they probably will prefer
to produce as standardized components as possible. By doing so, they not only obtain the best
short run protection of their market power, they also avoid the risk that one hearing instrument
manufacturer – by introducing a successful instrument based on a customized component –
should gain so much market share that captive production of components would be economi-
cal. (Had Siemens had a 50% market share, in-house production of transducers might have
been feasible.) So obviously, component suppliers have a strong interest in keeping their
customer base – the hearing instrument industry – fragmented, and one way of doing this is by
insisting on standard products.
As long as the hearing instrument manufacturers are not in a position to produce their own
components (at least not all of them, and especially not the transducers, as we have seen), the
manufacturers must rely on the components from suppliers. In a sense, this deadlocks
important dimensions of technological development in the industry, because the manufacturers
cannot internalize the entire technological system and optimize over all components.87 And a
component supplier cannot enter the manufacturing business (forward integration) alone, only
if component suppliers covering all component types go together they may succeed. We return
to this possibility in section 5.
4.5 Concluding on stabilizing factors
The hearing instrument industry is facing a demand with a potential, absolute maximum: The
number of customers that can be attracted – the hard-of-hearing people – ranges at about one
tenth of a population. The actual number of customers is between a fifth and a fourth of these
persons. This penetration ratio seems to be roughly the same in all countries. We have
attributed the low penetration ratio first of all to product quality, stigma and problems of
getting used to wearing a hearing instrument. These factors are very hard to change and we do
not expect major changes in this area. What is left to influence the total size of the market is
price. We estimate that free hearing instruments may (theoretically) double the US market in
terms of units, but without major new third-party payers (or totally new cost structures), price
reductions will not be profitable for the industry.
An industry with a very stable demand probably is not very conducive to major changes in
88 As opposed to a search good, an experience good cannot be evaluated by the customer effectively
before purchase. The customer cannot – without owning it – assess the value of an experience good.
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industry structure. It certainly is possible to move market shares in a situation with stable
demand, but not to the degree that could be expected if demand had been volatile. Fluctuating
demand allows new companies to come in during peak demand periods, while forcing out
companies during sluggish demand.
The dispenser-level has a direct, dampening effect on changes in industry structure. Having the
contact to the end-user, dispensers filter or adjust any information the manufacturers may want
to convey the end-users. This limits the use of mass-marketing, even if hearing instrument as
an experience good88 should be considered an area well suited for mass-marketing. And with a
stock of 11,000 dispensers in a country like USA, it is a daunting task for the relatively small
manufacturers to convince them about their products’ superior features. Instead, manufactur-
ers have resorted to “defensive” marketing, aiming at preventing once convinced dispensers
not to shift to a competing manufacturer. The stickiness of the dispenser level seems to make it
an almost impenetrable barrier for manufacturers, contributing heavily to stability.
Technology also has features that dampens turbulence. Its systemic character requires the
development process to emphasize system integration, not permitting quick, new product
introductions based on a single innovation. Add to this that economies of scale do not allow
manufacturers to produce their own components, but that they are produced as fairly standard-
ized goods by a very small number of suppliers. 
These two latter features of the industry, the sticky dispensers and the systemic technology, are
probably the major contributors to stability. They make it very difficult to move quickly in
developing and marketing a new product, and they therefore allow followers (other incumb-
ents) to catch up before an irreversible lead has been established. It is not that first-mover
advantages are eliminated altogether, but the advantage of being first with a new product is
certainly reduced.
To a large degree, one may take another element of industry behavior – the friendly oligopoly
– as natural reaction to this situation: If it is not possible to shake competitors with rapid
product introductions and capture end-users’ attention, then the companies might as well try
jointly to improve their situation by setting up a number of collaborative arrangements. These
collaborative efforts have the benefit of both reducing competition and pooling resources for
development. It also may reduce the risk of entry, if the members can more effectively build
competence together than individually. But with our data, it is still not possible to draw firm
conclusions on the question that always follows cooperative behavior among competitors: Is
there a benefit of free-riding, and if so, how can that be avoided? A tentative answer is that
over-all benefits of free-riding are perhaps not large, and more importantly, the price of free-
riding may be high: Trust and mutual respect could in this sense contribute to stability by
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including in the price of defection also the lost option of participating in future collaboration.
89 This cooperation includes a third company; Audiologic (US) which specializes in digital signal
processing technology.
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5 The future: Will stability prevail?
While the report to this point has been historical, in this section we shall try to look ahead and
speculate on what might happen to the friendly oligopoly in the future. We do not pretend to
be able to predict what will happen. We only try to identify changes in technology that may
threaten the stability
We start out by recapturing the latest developments in industry structure: Apparently merger
activities have been increasing over the last couple of years. We have seen Oticon buying a
relatively large competitor and establishing itself as a strong number three in the industry,
closely following Siemens and Starkey. Also, (not mentioned earlier) we have witnessed a
close bilateral cooperation between Danavox and ReSound,89 explicitly not a full-blown
merger, but with strong commitments to joint technology development, and we have seen
ReSound engage in yet another alliance with Philips. Again, this may well be pure incidents;
merger activity seems generally to follow unpredictable cycles, but these are signs of increased
concentration, and perhaps of a certain uneasiness or nervousness among the players. What
may be the reasons for a possible concentration? From two perspectives, digitalization and
changes in supplier structure, we will try to look ahead, in order to assess the structural
stability of the hearing instrument industry.
Further penetration of digital technology. This will essentially demand completely new
competencies of the part of hearing instrument manufacturers and require extensive investment
in R&D. Since Oticon respectively Widex launched their fully digital hearing instruments in
1995, only by the end of 1997 other instruments of that type has appeared. This indicates the
size of the task, but may also suggest that digital technology will only slowly be adopted by the
industry as such. At present, there is thus uncertainty whether digital signal processing
provides improved sound quality and speech recognition. But if d gital signal processing
proves to be of major value, and if the development of digital instruments are more resource-
demanding (which the collaboration between ReSound and Danavox plus the retarded
introduction from other players seem to suggest), then simple arguments about economies of
scale will apply and force mergers and shake-out. In that case, digital technology will in years
from now stand out as a radical innovation that caused a major restructuring of the industry.
An example of how this process could evolve may be the battle over fitting tools. Hitherto, as
mentioned in section 4.3, the industry has agreed on supporting the NOAH standards, relying
on dispensers to use PCs as the general hardware component. However, introducing Senso,
Widex made the strategic move of delivering the fully digital hearing instrument with an
extremely simple fitting box. By developing an independent fitting box, Widex went beyond
the NOAH-cooperation in the industry. Widex recognized the difficulty for dispensers in
90 Giving the new product a name that – at least for some – signals a dramatic shift in competitive
climate was probably unintended (“senso” means “war” in Japanese). 
91 Whether this is possible is not clear. That there is very little brand-awareness in the industry now,
does not necessary mean that building brands is impossible. And if possible, the companies trying
will at least not have to fight existing brands, since they simply do not exist. Despite the presence of
a large number of other stabilizing factors, the potentially very strong stabilizing factor of heavy
brand-loyalty cannot be said to influence this industry at present.
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purchasing and using computers and accommodated the (still many) computer-illiterate
dispensers by offering the fitting box. So even “traditional” dispensers are now given the
opportunity to dispense advanced hearing instruments, something very appealing. The PC-
based NOAH standard was established in order to expand the diffusion of programmable
hearing instruments by reducing the number of tools necessary for a dispenser to fit instru-
ments. Apparently, the presumption that dispensers would acquire PCs was to optimistic. At
least, many did not, and they are now offered the Senso fitting box that is much simpler to use
than the PC-based tools. In principle, it could be imagined that even drug stores and the like
could have the fitting box and be able to fit the Widex instrument. 
By circumventing an agreed industry standard, Widex may have caught many competitors “on
the wrong foot”.90 If they thought that they could rely on the NOAH equipment for fitting,
they now realize that they also have to develop a fitting box, probably postponing their
introduction of digital instruments further. If the digital instruments meet the expectations
(which is not yet clear), the box might have helped Widex to gain a lasting first-mover
advantage. However, most of the established hearing instrument companies may imitate the
technology, so for the advantage to endure it has to build upon a brand-loyalty that is unusual
for the industry.91
The Widex move may even have a larger impact on the industry: We have identified dispensers
as a major contributor to overall stability, but if the new Widex fitting box is actually so easy
to use as claimed, then it may revolutionize dispensing, eventually eliminating existing
dispensers. (Their detailed knowledge of audiology and available solutions may be superfluous
if one instrument can be very easily fitted to accommodate the most common hearing losses.)
Without the dispensers as a mediating factor, much more direct marketing (as in other
consumer products) may be applied. That would be to the benefit of the large companies, as
mass-marketing is very costly. Alternatively (as we discussed in section 4.2 under vertical
integration), if the Senso instruments can alleviate all types of hearing losses, Widex might be
tempted to set up their own dispenser-chains (most likely on a franchise basis). Also contribut-
ing to a shake-out may be the limited ability of un-experienced dispensers and potential
customers to cope with more than a hand-full of brands. And finally, it may lead to more
competition on price, favoring cost-efficient companies.
Even without exact numbers available, the success of the Senso seems to be unprecedented, a
92 Whether digital instruments will stay expensive or will drop in price as many other digitalized
electronic products remains to be seen.
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success that has taken the industry by surprise. After the very slow penetration of program-
mables, the expectations to the more advanced instruments probably were tuned down. After
all, digital instruments are very expensive92 and would probably only appeal to those that
otherwise would have acquired a programmable, indicating a small market. Also, competitors
should be expected to establish their own digital brands soon enough to share the success.
(Oticon was already there from the start.) But apparently, the Senso has the power to break
the rules.
Changes in the supplier structure may be another potential cause of turbulence in the manufac-
turer industry structure. With digital processing, integrated circuits (ICs) become more
important, and the hearing instrument manufacturers do possess the competencies needed for
the design of ICs, but not for the production of them. However, possibilities for sourcing
production capabilities exist. This leads to a decline in manufacturers’ dependence on suppli-
ers.
But the reverse is also true: Historically, it has been the hearing instrument manufacturers'
discretion to develop the amplifier and fitting algorithms. This is regarded as the "heart" or
"core" of the hearing instrument. However, with the advent of integrated circuits and hybrids,
suppliers of these components may become capable of entering amplifier production, which in
its turn will enable them to develop full-fledged hearing instruments. Imagine, if hybrid or IC
suppliers could buy fitting algorithms on the market and put them on their hybrids, then this
would establish the "core" of the hearing instrument as a product to be purchased on the free
market, inviting especially hybrid producers to integrate forward into the manufacture of
hearing instruments. A potential great advantage from such a move would be the integration in
one company of a large part of the systemicness of hearing instrument technology. If a single
company come to command a much larger market share this way than the leading firms have
now, the whole structure of the industry (including suppliers and dispensers) could change
dramatically.
Thus, as the two types of designers and producers (hearing instrument manufacturers and
hybrid suppliers) see their product areas increasingly overlapping, there may be a ground for
potential confrontation and turbulence, challenging the stability. There are “brakes”, though,
on the development: First, the required system integration is highly complex – even some of
the incumbent hearing instrument manufacturers are still struggling with it. This competence is
not easily attainable, and is therefore an important barrier to forward integration for suppliers.
Second, as long as there are alternative suppliers, hearing instrument manufacturers probably
will react to forward integration of an amplifier producer much the same ways as it reacted to
the move of Siemens when it integrated backwards into transducers: They will probably only
very reluctantly buy components from a supplier that is also active in their own core market.
93 Figueiredo & Teece (1996) provides examples from telecommunication equipment of this possibility.
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The move by an amplifier producer, therefore, might well be not only costly, but also ex-
tremely risky: It must consider the possibility that the customers of its traditional core product,
the amplifier, may turn their back to it, and go its competitors93 r start their own production.
Faced with this choice, it might be a safer strategy to concentrate on the production of
amplifiers.
Concluding on the future perspectives, we do see potentials for change. Also, the more
behavioral parts of the friendly oligopoly, the relationships building on mutual trust and
respect, might not last. While some relations may well survive, many may also break down if
the industry enters a more competitive era. As it takes a lot to build real friendships, maybe
only a few defections (or even perceived efections) may break long-lasting relations. Small
events may very well trigger processes that threaten the friendly oligopoly. A break-out from
the agreements on supporting the shared standards on fitting software, or a decision to expand
production capacity in order to be able to meet increased demand by own means may be
examples of non-cooperative behavior to which only tough answers apply.
Still, however, most of the forces of stability probably will be intact for a long time. These
“checks and balances” probably will keep the system running more or less unchanged for some
time. But the chances are, that only apparently small changes (such as one manufacturer
reaching MES for a critical component) may change the logic of the system entirely and drive
it into dramatic changes.
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6 Discussion and conclusion
Analyzing an empirical phenomenon so complex as an industry and applying so diverse
analytical tools as we do, must produce several findings and conclusions both regarding its
empirical subject matter and the theoretical perspectives applied. In this section we therefore
first conclude on the reasons for stability and then point at a number of theoretically interesting
results of the analysis.
Why stability?
This article was initiated by a curiosity as to why the hearing instrument industry seemed so
stable. Both current theorizing on industry development (based on product-life-cycles models)
and current perception of practice (hyper-competitive environments) led us to expect much
more turbulence in this particular industry.
Our "bricolage" of and triangulating data on market growth and size, concentration on
product-markets, entry/exit, and merger and acquisition activity did not change our perception
of the industry as one which is fairly stable, acknowledging some variation in market shares
over time.
First, though, a note on a feature of the industry that we do not count as a stabilizing factor:
Some would argue that the sheer small size of the industry may be taken as the explanation for
the stable development. The size, coupled with its fragmented character, implies that it does
not make economic sense to carry out broad scale technology development projects. Also, it
does not grant much rationale for huge marketing campaigns, or even entry. However, we
have no a priori reasons to believe that smaller industries should be more stable than larger
ones. Absolute profits may not be very large, but absolute investments may not need to be so
either. And at least, if an industry is small, then there must be larger industries with larger
companies with financial and technological muscles that potentially could take over small
industries. In other words, we do not accept that this industry may not be very “attractive” for
an investor with the right competencies or ideas.
In table 5, we sum up the stabilizing factors in the industry. Following our research strategy,
they range from suppliers to end-user. 
94 Again, we admit to be somewhat ruthless in our assessment here. Of course hearing instruments get
better, and frequently a new hearing instrument gets high scores in customer satisfaction surveys.
Still, however, even the digital instruments are not unanimously accepted as major improvements.
95 At this point, we need not distinguish between competence-enhancing and competence-destroying
innovations, since we have not observed any majordiscontinuities at the level of hearing instrument
functionality. We return to the question of innovations in components etc. below.
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Table 5
Stabilizing factors at and between levels of the hearing instrument industry
Suppliers - Manufacturers - Dispensers - End-users
Technology
used by all
manufactu-
rers.
Powerful
transducer
supplier.
Switching
costs.
Only little
customiz-
ation of
compon-
ents.
Systemic and
complex technol-
ogy.
High exit costs.
Patent pool.
Joint research.
Production agree-
ments.
"Tying-in".
Fitting soft-
ware.
Fragmented
structure.
Highly com-
plex decision
environment.
Insufficient
capabilities
in high-tech
instruments.
Lack of
marketing.
Independe-
nt counsel-
ing.
Technology
far from op-
timal.
Market not
transparent.
Users too old
to search.
Low price
elasticity.
We discussed in section 3 in some detail the possibility of new technology as a destabilizing
factor. We raised the question of whether stability in this particular industry is caused either by
lack of technological opportunities or by the stabilizing effects of structure and behavior of the
industry. Since we do not have the counterfactual information of “what would have happened
if there were no stabilizing factors”, we can of course draw only tentative conclusions on this
question. What we have not seen in the industry is a major innovation affecting the functional-
ity of the hearing instrument (making it clearly better).94 Such an innovation would be the
clearest example of a potentially destabilizing technological innovation.95 So what we might
want to explain is why we have not seen such an innovations in the industry during the past 25
years. Our answer to this question is twofold: First, because of the sticky distribution system
(dispensers), it would take time and resources for even a major improvement to affect market
shares. This reduces the incentive to pursue strategies of major breakthroughs. Second, the
organization of the industry is not conducive to major research projects. The peculiar structure
of a fragmented hearing instrument manufacturing industry that possesses the knowledge of
“systems integration” (coordinating the interaction of the different components) combined with
a highly concentrated component supplier industry that do barely more than developing “the
same but smaller” components, apparently is a deadlock. Again, we have no clues as to what
would have happened under a different industry structure, but this structure certainly is not
conducive to the kind of vertically integrated R&D projects that may take the technology a
major step further.
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What the structure of the industry does support, however, are developments along the
trajectory of miniaturization. We have witnessed as long series of discontinuities (innovations)
in the development of the different components of the hearing instrument; innovations
sponsored both by hearing instrument manufacturers and component suppliers. Most of them
have as their main advantage over preceding products their small size, but still roughly same
performance. This has allowed the existing manufacturers to take advantage of them without
requiring a major restructuring of their competence base. Therefore, the technical innovations
that actually have been developed, have not been competence-destroying, and have not
challenged the existence of incumbent manufacturers. 
Even if the past app. 25 years’ success of the stabilizing factors do not guarantee success in the
future, our preliminary conclusion is that the stabilizing factors will prevail for still some time.
As we spelled out in some detail in section 5, the whole “system” may not, however, be very
stable. We cannot be sure that only small changes can have major destabilizing effects. And
especially the success of the Senso is thought-provoking.
In the long run, at least, few industries remain intact, and we have already mentioned one
technology with truly revolutionizing power: The regeneration of hair cells in the ear would
essentially make a defect organ intact, entirely eliminating the need for a hearing instrument,
and obviously making the entire industry's competencies obsolete. This threat, however, it is
expected to be something to consider more seriously only some time well in the future.
Theoretical perspectives
As to the implications for theory and future research we find three lessons interesting:
First, no matter how appealing the theories of technology and industry development are
(Utterback & Abernathy, Henderson & Clark, and Anderson & Tushman), they seem to lack
the possibility of empirical testing and prediction. Despite our sympathies for the idea of
“architectural” innovations, it seems to be impossible ex ante to classify innovations into e.g.
one type with destabilizing effects on industry and another type without such potential. And
studies that pretend to do this, run a heavy risk of being tautologic. This problem may stem
form two sources: First, technology is multidimensional, so it is always difficult to “aggregate”
all of these dimensions into just one dimension. For example, a new engine may be fuel-saving
but at the same time be less flexible or reliable or easy to start or whatever. There is a real
problem in assessing the “value” of the change along all dimensions. And second, the “value”
of each change is not the same for all users. That is to say that each industry and each company
in an industry may have different benefits from adopting a specific innovation. Each company
has its own idiosyncratic set of competencies and the fit between a new technology and
existing competencies is a complex question. Finally, as in the hearing instrument industry, the
industries – which the technology is supposed to affect – may vary in terms of “resisting
capacity”. Some industries may be shaken easily, others – like the one we have studied – seem
to have built in a “bulwark” of stabilizing factors that prevent major changes to take place.
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Therefore, our lesson from this study is that classifications of innovations may have their own
“beauty” but the chances of turning them into predictive theories seem to be small. 
Second, what we call “stabilizing factors” is closely related to “entry barriers” in traditional
business economics or industrial organization. But with our interest in the long-term, over-all
stability of this particular industry, entry barrier is too narrow a concept. While entry is indeed
a major contributor to changes in structure, only large-scale entry usually has major impact on
industry behavior and performance. Entry in itself is therefore not the only phenomenon to
keep track of. Movements among incumbents may very well generate more important effects
than entry. In the industrial organization literature, it has implicitly been assumed that the
barriers to winning the first percent of the market for a newcomer are much higher than
gaining an additional percent on top of a market share of, say, 13% for an incumbent. There
may, of course, be good reasons for that, but still the barriers to gaining extra market share
may be worth more study than hitherto has been the case.
The present study therefore takes up the challenge expressed by Caves and Porter, and we
have focused as much on the factors preventing incumbents from winning market shares from
each other as on factors limiting new entry. Instead of talking of barriers-to-entry, we have
dealt with “barriers-to-change-of-the-established-order” or, as we label them, “stabilizing
factors”.
Industrial organization has a long tradition for analysis of entry, but in light of our study it
seems to be as interesting to broaden this perspective to include models for stability among
incumbents, in order to study the dynamics of the interaction between incumbents, a highly
relevant question that has received only little attention. Data certainly are difficult to establish,
but it probably would be fruitful to pursue both an in-depth strategy of selecting a limited
number of industries for which long term market share data may be made available, and
combining this strategy with studies on census-like data, however limited they are. The
purpose of such studies should first of all be to establish some general ideas of the degree of
stability, and secondly to identify important stabilizing factors. This would give the concept of
competition a more nuanced face.
To this end, we would include the two most important factors from the hearing aids industry,
the systemic character of technology and the stickiness of dispensers. As they seem to play an
important role in this industry, it may be worthwhile to examine their relevance in other
industries. Of course they should also be added to the standard list of barriers to entry.
Finally, we have been amazed by the puzzling coexistence of competitive and cooperative
behavior in the hearing instrument industry. Such patterns have received only limited interest,
but may be relatively frequent. Roughly, standard industrial organization studies mainly non-
cooperative situations, and is quick in condemning cooperation as welfare reducing and as
such just something to avoid. Some exceptions do exist, however, such as the discussions on
96 See also Kreiner & Schultz, 1992, for a study of the barter economy in biotech firms. In their
university-industry cases, however, trading of knowledge took place between non-competing actors.
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potential benefits from cooperation in R&D (see e.g. Jorde & Teece, 1992). A totally opposite
perspective is applied in the so-called network analysis that basically assumes away competi-
tion and studies the nature and benefits of cooperation. 
Another important exception is von Hippel (1987) who has provided an interesting study of
“know-how trading” in the steel mini-mill industry.96 In this industry, engineers willingly gave
away proprietary knowledge, provided that they could expect to get knowledge of more or
less same value back in a not so distant future. Our case seems to differ from the mini-mill case
both in breadth and managerial level. Hearing instrument companies seem to cooperate (or at
least mute competition) in more dimensions than R&D, and also the responsibility for coopera-
tion seems to be on central management, not just more or less autonomous engineers (who
also engage in know-how trading) .
Whether this is actually a relatively normal situation is hard to judge. No doubt anti-trust
authorities have changed business behavior, but it is interesting to recall the analysis of William
Fellner, almost 50 years ago. Fellner distinguished between two types of cooperation between
oligopolists:
“The difference between “true” agreement and quasi-agreement is that the former requires
direct contact while the latter does not.” (1949, p.16)
He acknowledged that competition is the fundamental condition since
“Agreements or quasi-agreements do not usually handle al  economic variables entering into the
determination of aggregate gains.” (1949, p. 34)
Competition is muted in some dimensions, but not in others:
“Economic behavior under fewness is imperfectly co-ordinated; it remains competitive in a
limited sense. The competitive element stays significant; it applies mainly to the dynamic
aspects of the problem which are connected with ingenuity and inventiveness and on the
discounting on which it is difficult to reach agreement.” (1949, p. 35)
Specifically, Fellner realizes that even if cooperation was supposed to cover all aspects of
business activities, “inventiveness” would always create asynchronous development between
the parties in the agreement, and that the agreement therefore must leave some aspect open for
competition:
“While oligopolistic firms typically live in a state of quasi-agreement, quasi-agreements do not
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typically cover the entire range of market variables. The main reason for this appears to be that
the relative strength of the participating firms is apt to change, and, if quasi-agreement included
no outlets, the pressure exerted by the firms whose relative strength has increased would, in
most cases, soon destroy the existing arrangements. The most significant reason for changes in
relative strength derives from inventiveness. Quasi-agreements frequently allow the participat-
ing firms to handle certain variables on an individual-competitive basis; and these variables are
apt to be more nearly associated with inventiveness than are the variables regulated by the
quasi-agreement.” (p. 183)
One of the main reason for the lack of studies in cooperative behavior is, of course, anti-trust
concerns. Companies are for good reasons very sensitive to the question of agreements, formal
and informal, with competitors. But if the business world has not dramatically changed since
1949, maybe cooperation and competition still go hand in hand much more frequently than we
normally assume. It certainly is a question that deserves more attention: How frequent is the
phenomenon and which forms does it take? We would especially add the question of which
conditions are conducive to collaboration? We conjecture that in the hearing instrument
industry collaboration is a result of limited possibilities for gaining competitive advantages over
rivals, a sort of “if tough competition does not move market shares but only reduces margins,
why bother”. But this perspective does not solve the usual “free rider problem” which is
haunting every cartel agreement. We have pointed at the importance of long-lasting relations
and the difficulty for free-riders of gaining advantage as factors contributing to “nice”
behavior, but still there is much to learn. However, a deeper understanding of collaboration
among competitors would help us also to assess its positive and negative aspects for society.
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